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i
The determined scholar and the man of virtue will not seek to live
at the expense of injuring their virtue. They will even sacrifice
their lives to preserve their virtue complete.
— Confucius —
If virtue, therefore, does not consist in propriety, it must consist
either in prudence or in benevolence.
— Adam Smith —
ii
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In the year 2000, visitors to Galleria Fabia Calvasina in Milan, Italy, could
enter an art installation and fill their pockets with as much cash as they
wanted. The responsible artist, Marianne Heier,1 had placed a year’s worth
of savings, totaling 5,173,000 Italian Lira (2,672 EUR), behind heavy curtains
and allowed the audience to stay alone with the money without any form of
external control. Although taking the money would have been easy, the
visitors faced the dilemma of taking something that Heier had worked hard
to earn. At the end of the five-hour-long exhibition, only 4.4% of the money
had disappeared.
Heier’s art project, called “Cracking Concrete,” as a reference to the
source of the endowment (Heier had been employed in various low-paying
jobs in order to accumulate her savings), exemplifies a phenomenon that
economists have studied extensively, but still struggle to agree upon: Why is
it that people sometimes appear to disregard their selfish motives on behalf
of moral sentiments? After all, standard economic theory predicts not only
that there would be no money left, but also that Heier faced strong incentives
against setting up the installation in the first place.
This doctoral dissertation studies people’s motives in sharing situations.
In three papers, it asks whether people have moral preferences, and to what
extent moral behavior is influenced by concerns other than moral motives.
The discussion is based upon new evidence from economic experiments that
are specifically designed to address these questions. The following section
explains some of the benefits of the experimental method, before Section 1.3
looks at how some economists have included moral concerns in their models.
Section 1.4 discusses how entitlements can be induced in experiments, and
Section 1.5 covers the role of social motives for sharing in anonymous settings.
The case for using simple experiments is laid out in Section 1.6. Finally, each
paper is summarized in Section 1.7.
1Marianne Heier is one of the select few invited to suggest a decorative concept for the
new NHH building, scheduled for completion in 2013.
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1.2 Economic experiments as a research method
Everyday life is riddled with confounding influences on behavior. This makes
it difficult to identify and ascertain the impact of moral motivation by an-
alyzing naturally occurring situations. For example, if Heier’s audience had
doubts about their privacy or the authenticity of the money, then they would
had fewer incentives to steal. It’s also not clear whether the primary moral
reason for leaving the money was a concern for Heier’s financial situation,
or a reluctance against interacting with a work of art. In order to deal with
such confounds, social scientists have developed a host of laboratory and field
experiments.
The experimental method is gradually gaining popularity among economists.
A primary reason for this is that it requires fewer and less stringent assump-
tions than other research methods in order to inform economic theory about
causal relationships. In an experimental setting, researchers have a large
degree of control over the participants’ environment. Thereby, researchers
can exogenously add and remove elements in an effort to learn about their
impact on behavior, or in an attempt to isolate the motives that are the focus
of the study. For example, researchers may establish complete anonymity so
that participants may reveal their private preferences without concerns about
being scrutinized. With control over the environment, the only assumption
that is required for inference is that randomization works.
Randomization refers to the process by which participants are randomly
assigned to different treatment groups. The purpose of randomization is to
create a valid counterfactual which can be used as basis for measuring treat-
ment effects. To see why randomization matters, consider how one would
go about estimating the effect of business education on income. A näıve ap-
proach would be to compare the income of people with and without business
education. This method is likely to give a faulty answer because it does not
account for other differences between the two samples. For example, men
may be more likely to earn a business degree than women, and, if men are
generally paid more than women, this would make business education seem
more profitable than it really is. This gender problem could be solved by
4
restricting the study to contain only men (or women). However, it is likely
that there will also be non-observable differences between the samples, mean-
ing that they can not be dealt with in the same manner. This would be the
case if, for instance, those who opt for a business degree are more willing, on
average, to sacrifice other benefits in order to achieve higher wages.
One way of handling non-observable characteristics is to minimize the
likelihood that there will be systematic differences between the samples, be-
sides the treatment. This can be achieved by randomly selecting the people
who are given business education. As long as the samples are large enough,
and the selection process is truly random, randomization will eliminate all
sample differences.2 Any remaining differences in income levels can then only
be attributed to the difference in business education.
1.3 Moral motivation in economic theory
Standard economic theory assumes that all people are exclusively concerned
with maximizing their own private utility, and that utility only arises from
private materialistic consumption. Though the standard theory is seldom
thought to be based on realistic assumptions, it is popular because it is seen
as having substantial explanatory and predictive power when it comes to eco-
nomic outcomes (Friedman, 1953). In addition, relatively little information
is required to predict people’s behavior. This makes the theory extremely
portable.
Adam Smith provided an early argument for the standard theory when
he noted that we do not address the baker’s benevolence in order to get
bread, but rather his self-interest (Smith, 1776). Smith also provided a moral
rationale for why people should be allowed to maximize their own selfishness:
“By pursuing his own interest, he frequently promotes that of the society
more effectually than when he really intends to promote it” (Ibid., book IV,
p. 364). The argument is based on a belief that specializing in one’s own
2While one can not know for certain that the distributions of non-observable factors
are equalized by randomization, the strength of this assumption can be gauged by testing
whether there are observable differences between the groups.
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work will lead to technological advances and skill accumulation that will
have positive spill-over effects to the wider economy. In other words, Smith
thought that a capitalist economy would bring about a more efficient use of
the available resources and therefore promote overall welfare better than a
feudalistic economy would.
Four decades earlier (in 1738), mathematician Daniel Bernoulli showed
how private utility, U , can be expressed mathematically as a function that
takes consumption, c, as its only argument (Bernoulli, 1954):
U = log(c) (1.1)
The concavity of Bernoulli’s utility concept was inspired by a behavioral
trait known as the St. Petersburg paradox. The paradox is that people’s
subjective valuations of a risky bet are often smaller than the bet’s expected
value. The paradox is (partly) solved by assuming that the utility function
is concave, because this shape implies that people are risk averse.3 More
recently, economic experiments have identified other behavioral traits, many
of which are not captured in the standard model. For example, there is con-
siderable evidence indicating that people exhibit other-regarding preferences.
In other words, individuals often make economic choices that suggest they
also care about other people than themselves.
The most striking evidence of other-regarding preferences comes from
dictator game experiments (Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, and Sefton, 1994).
In the standard version of this experiment, participants are paired and given
a sum of money. One participant in each pair is then given the role as dictator
with the authority to allocate the money within the pair as he (or she) sees
fit. The other participant has no say in the decision and must accept the
outcome that is decided for him. By ending the experiment after a single
decision, and by not allowing the participants to learn each other’s identity,
strategic motives for sharing are removed. Even so, the typical result is that
a majority of dictators share some of the money with the other participant.
3The bet that made the St. Petersburg paradox famous has an infinite expected value.
Therefore, the concavity of the utility function can not explain finite subjective valuations
for this particular bet.
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Average offers are often 20 to 30% of the endowment. (Camerer, 2003; Engel,
2011). The main results are robust to variations in parameters, such as the
stakes and the subject pool, and this has led many to conclude that the
willingness to share without expecting anything in return should be reflected
in economic theory.
There are many ways to capture a regard for others in a formalized theory.
Levine (1998) includes the other’s utility as an argument in the agent’s util-
ity function. A more indirect approach, reflecting the fact that a receiver’s
utility is private information, is to make the agent’s utility function depen-
dent on the transfers to the other (Andreoni, 1990). A third option is to
make preferences dependent on distributional aspects, such as in models with
inequality aversion or maximin preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton
and Ockenfels, 2000; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004). Moral concerns can also
be defined over acts, rather than outcomes (Brekke, Kverndokk, and Nyborg,
2003), and made conditional on the other person’s behavior (Rabin, 1993;
Charness and Rabin, 2002). Common for all these models is that they de-
scribe economic agents as facing trade-offs between private self-interest and
moral concerns. By following this approach, the behavioral theories can be
seen as refining, rather than replacing, the standard theory.
1.4 Real effort dictator games
Heier’s “Cracking Concrete” installation resembles a dictator game experi-
ment in many ways. Each visitor can be regarded as a dictator with the
power to decide how much of the money to leave for the next visitor.4 And
even though other people in the gallery could observe who entered the instal-
lation, the fact that more than one person could enter effectively removed the
possibility to identify those who took any money. The visitors could there-
fore act as if they were anonymous. However, in standard versions of the
dictator game it is rare for dictators to share more than half of the money.
If this behavior was replicated in “Cracking Concrete,” then the displayed
4Depending on whether the audience knew when the exhibition would end, the last
visitor decided the outcome for Heier or a potential next visitor.
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money would quickly dwindle down and disappear. Instead, almost all the
money was left for the artist at the end.
An important clue for understanding Heier’s outcome lies in the title
and preparation of her project. She made it clear that she had earned the
money by doing laborious work, and economic experiments have shown that
accountability may have an important impact on what people regard to be a
fair distribution. Konow (1996) proposes that when an endowment is earned
through discretionary means, the agent will have an entitlement that is pro-
portional to the value of the factors he could influence. Likewise, he will
not be held accountable for factors outside his control. The entitlement con-
stitutes his fair share. This idea has since been tested in dictator games
where the participants have to earn their money in stead of receiving it as a
windfall.5
In general terms, when dictators earn the entire endowment alone, they
share very little, if at all (Cherry, Frykblom, and Shogren, 2002; Oxoby
and Spraggon, 2008). When the receivers are the ones earning it, good
performers are, on average, given more than they would have received if
the endowment had been decided exogenously, while poor performers are
punished with slightly smaller offers (Ruffle, 1998; Oxoby and Spraggon,
2008). In situations where dictators get to allocate the combined earnings
of both the dictator and the receiver, average offers typically reflect those
differences in the individual earnings that are due to discretionary factors, but
not differences that arise exogenously (Konow, 2000; Frohlich, Oppenheimer,
and Kurki, 2004; Cappelen, Sørensen, and Tungodden, 2010).6 However,
many dictators are allocating less than the receiver’s entitlement, presumably
because it is in their narrow self-interest to keep more than their fair share.
5Even though Heier had strong entitlements to the money, the visitors had to trust
that all subsequent visitors also would respect these entitlements in order to reach a fair
allocation. If they believed that other undeserving visitors would take the money, then
even fair-minded visitors would be better off by taking the money for themselves. Trust
is explored experimentally by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995); Croson and Buchan
(1999); Birkeland, Cappelen, Sørensen, and Tungodden (2011).
6Cappelen, Drange Hole, Sørensen, and Tungodden (2007) find that choosing whether
or not to invest in risky bets affects entitlements, even though the choices do not require
any effort. They also find evidence of considerable heterogeneity in what information
participants rely upon when they evaluate entitlements.
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Cappelen et al. (2007) propose a theory of individual utility that incorpo-
rates entitlement concerns.7 A simplified version of the model can be stated
by defining utility, V , as a function of the consumption that can be financed
by the amount that the agent keeps to himself, c, and the agent’s entitlement,
E. By writing the total endowment as X, the offer that a dictator will make
is given by X − c. The specific form of the utility function is:




where β ≥ 0 is a parameter describing how much the agent is concerned
about deviating from his entitlement. The amount of consumption that
optimizes V , is given by c∗. The interior solution of c∗ is:




Equation 1.3 shows that the agent will always keep at least the amount
he feels entitled to. Depending on β, he may also keep an extra amount
because the utility he gains from consuming this extra amount is larger than
the disutility of deviating from his fair share.8 A crucial difference from
Bernoulli’s utility function, given in equation 1.1, is that c∗ depends on the
agent’s perceived entitlement, and therefore on information about the source
of the endowment.
The idea that economic decisions are made over a subjective perception,
rather than an objective representation, of the world can explain other fram-
ing effects as well. For example, it is well documented that people are averse
to losses, and that the definition of what constitute a loss can be manipulated
by the framing of the situation (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Camerer,
2000). In Chapter 4, I investigate whether entitlements also influence the
dictators’ sense that offers induces losses with respect to what they have.
7See Cappelen, Konow, Sørensen, and Tungodden (forthcoming) for another application
of the model.
8If β < 1, then the agent will keep the entire endowment.
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1.5 Social motives for sharing anonymously
Clearly, altruistic acts are not always driven by moral motives alone. Social
motives, differing from moral motives in that they depend on the judgment
from those who observe the act, often provide a more intuitive explanation
for displayed altruism. For example, charitable giving may be a way for
the giver to buy himself a good reputation or to improve his legacy. In ex-
perimental economics it has generally been assumed that social motivation
is eliminated by requiring that the participants behave anonymously. This
assumption is seriously challenged by Dana, Cain, and Dawes (2006), who
argue that “giving often reflects a desire not to violate others’ expectations
rather than a concern for others’ welfare per se.” They base this claim on ex-
perimental evidence showing that a large share of dictators are willing to pay
the researchers money if that will keep the receivers uninformed about the
experiment. Supporting evidence has since emerged in experiments by Dana,
Weber, and Kuang (2007); Broberg, Ellingsen, and Johannesson (2007); An-
dreoni and Bernheim (2009); Lazear, Malmendier, and Weber (2012).
In order to meet the expectations of another person, it is first necessary
to have an idea about what the other person’s expectations may be. So-
called second-order expectations may be shaped by any information that is
available about the receiver. This includes instructions informing dictators
that the receiver is another person in the same room, or that all participants
are recruited by the same method. One of the findings of Dana et al. (2006)
is that dictators commonly assume that the receivers are aware of their own
role. This illustrates that a lack of information does not hinder dictators
from forming beliefs about their counterpart.
Meeting the receiver’s expectations may be seen as important because
it symbolizes that the dictator understands and respects the receiver. On
a similar note, Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) suggest that some dictators
are primarily concerned with signaling their respect for social norms, such
as equal divisions of windfall endowments. When dictators believe that their
actions will be admired by others, they may experience a sensation of pride
(Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008b). On the other hand, failing to live up
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to the receiver’s expectations may create a sense of disappointment for the
receiver, and a sense of guilt or shame for the dictator (Charness and Dufwen-
berg, 2006; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007; Ellingsen, Johannesson, Tjøtta,
and Torsvik, 2010).
Social motivation is a complex concept because it involves strategic rea-
soning.9 Even amoral agents may seek to portray themselves as moral-
minded if they believe that their actions are observed by individuals with
moral preferences. In the extreme, it is possible to imagine an entire society
where all acts of altruism arise from an expectation that other people care
about fairness, while no one actually does so. A consequence of this potential
phenomenon is that much of the existing experiments on sharing behavior
offer little insight into the prevalence of moral preferences.
Chapters 2 and 3 investigate and discuss the relative importance of intrin-
sic moral motivation and extrinsic social motivation in anonymous dictator
games – i.e., these chapters ask whether dictators who share do so voluntar-
ily, or because they feel forced to do it. These chapters also provide evidence
for whether it is the most or the least generous dictators who would most
prefer to avoid the sharing situation, and whether or not guilt aversion en-
genders more influence on sharing than pride. Finally, these chapters explore
the cultural dimension of altruism by conducting comparative experiments
in both Norway and China.
1.6 What can be learned form dictator games?
In his meta-study, Engel (2011) identifies more than a hundred published ver-
sions of the dictator game. Not surprisingly, the list of factors that influence
generosity is long. Since lab experiments are conducted in contexts that are
different from out-of-lab settings, it is understandable if some people doubt
what can actually be learned from behavior inside the lab. The issue is per-
haps particularly relevant for dictator games because they are exceptionally
9Geanakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1989) develop a system called psychological




Levitt and List (2007) provide a critical discussion on the external validity
of lab experiments. They point out that lab results may both over- and
understate the prevalence of pro-social actions, since social norms, the nature
and level of scrutiny, restrictions on the choice sets and the time horizon, as
well as other factors differ across situations. However, Levitt and List do not
deny that it is likely that these factors affect behavior in systematic ways.
For example, they suggest that people are more likely to behave pro-socially
in front of their children or if their behavior is being televised.
The question of external validity has inspired some researchers to com-
pare dictator game behavior in lab and field environments. Stoop (2012)
gives knowing and unknowing participants transparent envelopes containing
two 5 euro bills. The envelopes are addressed to another person, and Stoop
registers how many envelopes are sent to this receiver. About half of the
envelopes are received, and statistical tests do not reveal any differences in
behavior between the treatments. Using a within-subject design, Benz and
Meier (2008) find that donations to charity funds from inside and outside the
lab correlate, but that generosity is more accentuated in the lab. Similarly,
Carlsson, He, and Martinsson (2009) also find that dictators giving to a char-
ity are more generous in the lab than in the field, but in both settings offers
are smaller if the endowment is earned rather than a windfall. Finally, Small
and Loewenstein (2003) conclude that the effect of matching the receiver
after (as opposed to before) the allocation decision is made is comparable
in the lab and the field, but their design does not make it meaningful to
compare the levels of generosity in the two settings. In sum, the evidence
suggests that while one should be careful to extrapolate quantitative results
from one context to another, there are still qualitative lessons to be learned
in the lab.10
10Efforts are also being taken to test empirically whether dictator game behav-
ior is correlated with broader outcomes in life. For example, Catherine Weinberger
(www.econ.ucsb.edu/ weinberg/CCCS.html) is working on linking dictator offers from
a 2002 experiment to labor choices for more than 550 college students. Similarly, a group
of scientists at the Choice Lab at NHH (www.thechoicelab.no) is planning to track career
developments for more than 500 middle school pupils who participated in dictator games
in 2011.
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It is notable that despite its simplicity, the dictator game was only in-
vented after decades of running experiments in the laboratory. Early exper-
iments tended to emulate markets, and the first oligopoly experiments were
designed by Hoggatt (1959); Sauermann and Selten (1959). In these experi-
ments, the decision units were “firms” facing complicated demand functions,
and each firm could be controlled by a group of students. While such de-
signs could establish whether the emulated markets were Pareto optimal, it
was rather difficult to analyze the behavior of the individual participants.
Fouraker, Siegel, and Harnett (1962) simplified these designs by studying
bilateral monopolies where individual “sellers” posted prices that individual
“buyers” could respond to by deciding their quantities. Already at this time,
much of the economic realism was sacrificed for the sake of clarity.
Two decades later, Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze (1982) presented
the first ultimatum game. The ultimatum game is similar to a dictator game,
with the exception that the receiver is given the authority to turn down the
dictator’s offer. If the offer is rejected, then neither of the two receive any
part of the endowment. This experiment mimics a sale which can generate
both consumer and producer surplus, but only if the buyer decides to ac-
cept the seller’s offer. By restricting the buyer to a maximum purchase of
one unit, the ultimatum game can be seen as a further simplification of the
oligopoly experiment of Fouraker et al. (1962). It is also a simplification of
the sequential bargaining experiments conducted by St̊ahl (1972). In these
experiments, bargaining takes place over several rounds, and unless the par-
ticipants manage to come to an agreement, the final round is an ultimatum
game.
The game theoretical solution of the ultimatum game is for the seller to
offer the lowest possible amount to the buyer. If buyers only care about pri-
vate materialistic consumption, then they will not refuse the offer since that
would leave them with nothing. However, though results differ with respect
to the experimental environment, it is not uncommon for buyers to reject of-
fers of 20% of the endowment, or for seller’s to offer half of their endowment
(Güth and Tietz, 1990). By helping to understand the motivations that are
in play in the ultimatum game, the dictator game of Forsythe et al. (1994)
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also provide insights into the reasoning in much more complex bargaining
situations.
Few out-of-lab settings are so similar to the dictator game experiment
as the “Cracking Concrete” art project. Even so, every one of us is almost
consistently in situations where we can share our resources with others. And,
almost just as often, we leave resources behind which could easily have been
appropriated. It is to be hoped that the experiments presented in this dis-
sertation will contribute to an improved understanding of the motives that
influence allocation decisions, in the lab and outside.
1.7 Summaries
1.7.1 Face-saving or fair-minded: What motivates moral
behavior?
Co-authored with Alexander W. Cappelen, Erik Ø. Sørensen, and Bertil Tun-
godden
In this paper, we study the interactive roles of intrinsic moral motivation
and extrinsic social motivation. We present a novel experimental design
which varies the moral arguments for giving, as well as whether the receivers
will be informed or not about the game. The main insight from this paper is
that moral arguments are the key for understanding sharing behavior. Social
motives are found to have a crowding-in effect, and are only relevant when the
dictators have a moral reason to give. When the social motives are excluded
because the receivers will not be told about the origin of the transfer, sharing
behavior in the lab correlates with self-reported sharing behavior outside the
lab and with political preferences. When dictators are given the option to
change their receiver’s information, we find that almost as many dictators
prefer that the receiver know about the game, as those who prefer that the
receiver be uninformed. This indicates that there may be substantial social
gains from giving, as well as social costs.
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1.7.2 Guilt aversion and social esteem in China: Evi-
dence from a real effort dictator game
Here I ask to what extent the influence of extrinsic social motivation is de-
pendent on the subject sample. I hypothesize that receiver expectations have
more motivating power in societies where one’s social image plays a more cru-
cial role in everyday life. To test this idea, I translate the experiment in the
first paper from Norwegian to Mandarin and conduct it with Chinese partici-
pants. The results of the second experiment indicate that the Chinese sample
felt they had a moral obligation to share in a situation where the Norwegians
did not think they had any reason to share. The information decisions are
consistent with both guilt aversion and pride playing a role, but these mo-
tives do not affect the average levels of sharing to a statistically significant
extent. When compared to the previously obtained results from Norway, the
new data show that the influences of both intrinsic moral motivation and
extrinsic social motivation depend on the participants’ culture.
1.7.3 Are dictators loss averse?
Making use of the dynamic structure of real effort experiments, I investigate
whether dictators are more willing to share from an earned endowment before
it is actually earned, compared to after it is earned. The inspiration for the
experiment comes from reports suggesting that people are loss averse with
respect to their status quo wealth. Before a dictator performs an earning
task, a commitment to share will effectively lead to a reduction in the gain
he is about to receive. However, after passing the earning task, any offer
will have to be subtracted from his endowment and is therefore more likely
to be perceived as a loss. The experiment is conducted with two sets of
instructions, whereof the first asks dictators to record the amount they wish
to give and the second asks for the amount they wish to receive.
The timing of the allocation decision, relative to the earning task, has no
influence on the offers from the male participants. The female participants
react on the timing to a statistically significant degree, but in opposite ways
depending on which instructions are used. The conclusion is that dictators
15
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Abstract: We study the relative importance of intrinsic moral mo-
tivation and extrinsic social motivation in explaining behavior in the dicta-
tor game. The key feature of our experiment is that we introduce a novel
treatment design that manipulates these two dimensions of the distributive
problem. In one set of treatments, we manipulate the moral argument for
sharing, in another we manipulate the information given to the recipient
about the context and the dictator’s decision. The paper offers four main
findings. First, we provide evidence of intrinsic moral motivation being of
fundamental importance. Second, we show that extrinsic social motivation
matters and is crowding-in with intrinsic moral motivation. Third, we find
that extrinsic social motivation generates behavior that is consistent with
some participants being motivated by guilt and shame and others by social
esteem and pride. Fourth, we show that the sharing behavior in the dictator
game is strongly associated with self-reported charitable giving outside the
lab and with political preferences.
2.1 Introduction
A prominent idea in behavioral economics is that people are morally moti-
vated, and the introduction of moral preferences (Kahneman, Knetsch, and
Thaler, 1986a,b) has generated important work in most fields of economics.2
The most influential piece of empirical evidence underlying this development
has been the observation that in lab experiments people consistently give
away a substantial share of money in the dictator game. The dictator game
was introduced by Forsythe et al. (1994), and since then more than a hun-
dred dictator games have been published from all parts of the world (Engel,
2011). A key feature of the dictator game is that it rules out selfish reasons
for sharing, and the most common interpretation of generosity in the dictator
2Some examples include: political economy of redistribution (Alesina and Angeletos,
2005), bargaining (Bruyn and Bolton, 2008), game theory (Rabin, 1993), public good
provision (Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010), contracts (Fehr, Hart, and Zehnder, 2011), la-
bor markets (Charness, 2004), general equilibrium theory (Dufwenberg, Heidhues, Kirch-
steiger, Riedel, and Sobel, 2011), development (Karlan, 2005), incentive theory (Ellingsen
and Johannesson, 2008a), and axiomatic utility theory (Karni and Safra, 2002).
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game has therefore been that people are intrinsically morally motivated. A
recent important literature (Dana et al., 2006, 2007; Broberg et al., 2007;
Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Lazear et al., 2012), however, has questioned
this interpretation, arguing that in the dictator game people may be moti-
vated by the fact that their decision is observed by an anonymous recipient:
“Just knowing that one is the anonymous dictator that the receiver will think
badly of can be sufficient to compel giving” (Dana et al., 2006, p. 201). Thus,
sharing in the dictator game does not necessarily only reflect intrinsic moral
motivation, but may also be driven by extrinsic social motivation.3
To understand the underlying motivation of moral behavior is of cru-
cial importance in order to provide better models of human decision-making,
and the present paper seeks to address this issue by studying the relative im-
portance of intrinsic moral motivation and extrinsic social motivation in the
dictator game. The key feature of our experiment is that we introduce a novel
treatment design that manipulates these two dimensions of the distributive
problem. In one treatment variation, we manipulate the moral argument
for sharing, in another we manipulate the information given to the recipient
about the context and the dictator’s decision.
We manipulate the moral argument for sharing by changing the condi-
tions of the recipient, where we focus on entitlements and needs, which have
been suggested to be the moral considerations that account for the largest
fraction of giving in the real world (Konow, 2010). In the baseline treatment,
the recipient is a student who has not contributed to the money that is to
be distributed, whereas in two other treatments we introduce an entitlement
argument and a needs argument for sharing, respectively. In the entitlement
treatment, the recipient is a student who has contributed to the same extent
3The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation has a long history in psy-
chology and sociology, and has more recently also been introduced in economics, see for
example Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997); Gneezy and Rustichini (2000); Benabou and
Tirole (2003). In the economic literature, the focus has been on the interaction between
the individual’s intrinsic motivation to perform a task for its own sake and the extrin-
sic motivation of doing the task to achieve an external monetary reward. In the present
study, the focus is on the interaction between the individual’s intrinsic moral motivation
to share because he or she considers it the morally right thing to do and the extrinsic
social motivation to share because it gives an external social reward.
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as the dictator; in the needs treatment, the recipient is a poor microfinance
client in a developing country. To study the role of information, we imple-
ment these three treatments in a 3×2 design, where in one set of treatments
the recipient is given complete information about the context and decision
made by the dictator (in the following referred to as treatments with complete
information), and in the other set of treatments is given no such information
(in the following referred to as treatments with no information). This design
allows us to study intrinsic moral motivation by comparing sharing behavior
in the baseline treatment to sharing behavior when there is a moral argument
for sharing, and to study extrinsic social motivation by comparing the treat-
ments where the recipient is given complete information to the treatments
where the recipient is given no information. Furthermore, this design also
allows us to study whether introducing an extrinsic social motive for sharing
is crowding-in or crowding-out the intrinsic moral motivation.
After the dictators have decided how much to give away, but before this
is revealed to the recipients, the dictators are given the opportunity to switch
to the other information condition. Dictators in the complete information
treatments can decide that no information is given to the recipient, and dicta-
tors in the no information treatments can decide that complete information is
given to the recipient. Their information choices allow us to explore in more
detail the nature of the extrinsic social motivation. In particular, we can
study whether the extrinsic social motivation for giving is consistent with
participants being motivated by guilt and shame or by social esteem and
pride, where the crucial distinction between these two sources of motivation
in the present study is that guilt and shame generate disutility and social es-
teem and pride generate positive utility.4 The information choice also sheds
light on why some people actively seek to avoid sharing situations, which has
been observed both in the lab (Dana et al., 2006; Broberg et al., 2007; Lazear
et al., 2012) and in the field (DellaVigna, List, and Malmendier, 2012). In
the last part of the experiment, we collect background information and ask
4This distinction is consistent with the models offered in the recent economic literature
on extrinsic social motivation, see for example Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007); Ellingsen
and Johannesson (2008a); Andreoni and Bernheim (2009); Ellingsen and Johannesson
(2011), but clearly does not exhaust the differences investigated in this literature.
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the participants to comment on what motivated their decision, which adds
to our understanding of the decision making process underlying the observed
behavior.
The paper offers four main findings. First, we provide evidence of intrinsic
moral motivation being of fundamental importance for the sharing behavior
of the participants. When there is no obvious moral argument for sharing,
most participants do not give anything to the recipient, whereas they give
away a substantial share when we introduce a moral argument. The impor-
tance of the moral argument is also reflected in the explanations made by
the participants, where they emphasize both entitlements and needs consid-
erations. Second, we show that extrinsic social motivation matters, and we
identify a crowding-in effect in situations where there is a moral argument
for sharing. Third, we show that the participants are divided on whether
to give information or not to the recipients, which is consistent with some
participants being motivated by guilt and shame and others by social esteem
and pride. Fourth, we show that the sharing behavior in the dictator game is
strongly associated with self-reported charitable giving outside the lab and
with political preferences.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 presents the
sample and the experimental design. Section 2.3 provides an overview of
the treatment effects and relates them to the explanations provided by the
participants, whereas Section 2.4 reports from a regression analysis. In Sec-
tion 2.5, we show how the results from the second part of the experiment
shed light on the nature of extrinsic social motivation, and in Section 2.6 we
discuss related literature and how our findings relate to charitable behavior
in the field.
2.2 Sample and design
We recruited participants among students at the Norwegian School of Eco-
nomics (NHH), and 200 of them were randomly allocated to the role as
dictator. In addition to the dictators, there was an equal number of recip-
ients who did not make any decisions in the experiment, as we explain in
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more detail below.
We had seven sessions that each lasted about 40 minutes and took place
on the same day. Individuals were randomly allocated to treatments within
sessions and each subject participated in only one session. All dictators re-
ceived a show-up fee of 100 NOK (approximately 17.50 USD), in addition
to what they earned in the distribution phase of the experiment. The ex-
periment was double blind, i.e., neither participants nor experimenters could
associate decisions with particular participants, and used a web-based inter-
face.5
At the beginning of the experiment, all dictators were informed about the
rules of the game, and given a description of how the game would proceed.6
The experiment consisted of three phases: a production phase, a distribution
phase, and a questionnaire phase. In the production phase the dictators were
asked to work for 15 minutes on a task consisting of ticking off numbers in
a matrix. They were told that they had completed the task when they had
reached a threshold level of correct responses, and all participants managed
to do so. We did not say anything in advance about payment for completing
the task.
In the distribution phase, the dictators were randomly allocated into dif-
ferent treatments. In the base treatment (T1), they were informed that they
had earned 200 NOK ($35) for completing the production phase. They were
also told that they were matched with another student at NHH, randomly
selected from the student body member registry. The dictators were then
asked to decide how to share their earnings between themselves and this other
person. They were informed that the money would be sent to the other per-
son, after the experiment, together with the following letter explaining the
5Special care was taken so that the payment procedure ensured participant-
experimenter anonymity. At the end of the experiment the computer assigned a payment
code to each of the dictators, and a group of assistants, who were not present in the
lab during the experiment, prepared envelopes containing the payments corresponding to
each payment code. The assistants also made sure that it was impossible to identify the
amount of money by simply looking at the envelope. After bringing the envelopes to the
lab, the assistants immediately left and the envelopes were handed out in accordance with
the payment codes.
6Instructions were given in Norwegian, see the web-appendix for an English translation.
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context and the decision of the dictator: “You have been selected to receive
x NOK from an economic experiment conducted at the Norwegian School of
Economics (NHH). Your name has been randomly selected among the stu-
dents at NHH. In this experiment a participant, who is also a student at
NHH, has earned 200 NOK by performing a task. The participant was then
informed that he (or she) had been matched with another person, randomly
selected among the other students at NHH (i.e. you), and was asked to de-
cide how much of the 200 NOK he wanted to give to you. Before he made his
choice, he was shown a copy of this letter. He decided to give you x NOK,
which is enclosed to this letter. If the envelope does not contain any money,
however, the participant decided not to give you any of his earnings.” To en-
sure that the dictators could trust that the transfer would actually take place
if they decided to give away a share of the money, they were informed (in
all treatments) that after the experiment, they could obtain an anonymous
copy of the transaction from the accounting department as verification.7
In the other treatments we manipulated two dimensions of the distributive
problem. In the treatments T2-T3, we manipulated the moral argument for
sharing; in the treatments T1*-T3*, we manipulated the information given
to the recipient about the context and the dictator’s decision. In all other
respects, the treatments were identical. In particular, in all treatments the
dictator had to decide how much, out of 200 NOK, to transfer to a recipient.
In T2, we introduced an entitlement argument for sharing. We did so
by letting the recipient be another student at NHH who had also signed up
for the experiment, but who was randomly assigned the role as recipient and
sent to a different room. The recipients were asked to do the same task as the
dictators, again without any mentioning of payment for completing the task.
When the recipients had completed the task, they were paid the show-up
fee and told that they had completed the experiment. Each dictator in this
treatment was matched with one such recipient, and then told that each had
7The participants would then have to send an e-mail with their payment code to the
accounting department, which would verify that the transfer that had taken place. 1 out of
200 dictators did request a verification. The participants were also given the opportunity
to provide anonymous comments on the experiment. In these comments no one expressed
any doubt about the transfers taking place.
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earned 100 NOK by completing the task. The dictator was also told that the
recipient was not aware of this payment, but would be informed by the letter
that would accompany the money that the dictator decided to transfer to
the recipient.8 Thus, in contrast to T1, the recipient in T2 could be seen as
having the same entitlements as the dictator, a moral argument that could
motivate sharing.
In T3, we introduced a needs argument for sharing. We did so by letting
the recipient be a client in the microcredit institution PRIDE Tanzania.9
Again, the context of both the dictator and the recipient was explained in
detail in the letter that accompanied any money given away.10 Thus, in
8The wording of the letter to the recipient in treatment T2 was as follows: “You have
been selected to receive x NOK from an economic experiment conducted at the Norwegian
School of Economics (NHH). Your name has been randomly selected among the students
in the room you were sitting in during the experiment on Tuesday November 3. In this
experiment a participant in a different room, who is also a student at NHH, has earned 100
NOK by performing the same task as you. The participant was then informed that he (or
she) had been matched with another person, randomly selected among the other students
that participated in the experiment (i.e. you). He was informed that you had completed
the same task. He was also informed that you had earned the same amount, 100 NOK,
but that you had not been informed about this. We then asked him to decide how much
of the joint earnings of 200 NOK, he wanted to give to you. Before he made his choice, he
was shown a copy of this letter. He decided to give you x NOK, which is enclosed to this
letter. If the envelope does not contain any money, however, the participant decided not
to give you any of the money that the two of you had earned.”
9PRIDE Tanzania is the largest microcredit institution in Tanzania, with approxi-
mately 70 000 clients. The clients involved in the present study were all selected from a
branch in Dar es Salaam. Norway is one of the richest and Tanzania one of the poorest
countries in the world, a fact that is well-known by most Norwegians. GDP per capita is 47
times higher in Norway than Tanzania, see Table 6 in International Comparison Program
(2008), and the Norwegian government and Norwegian donors are extensively involved in
aid work in Tanzania.For a more detailed discussion of the clients and context of PRIDE
Tanzania, see Berge, Bjorvatn, and Tungodden (2012).
10The wording of the letter to the recipient in treatment T3 was as follows: “You have
been selected to receive x NOK (equivalent to y USD) from an economic experiment
conducted at the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH) in Norway. Your name has been
randomly selected among the clients in the micro finance institution PRIDE TANZANIA
in Dar es Salaam in Tanzania. In this experiment a participant, who is a student at NHH,
earned 200 NOK by performing a task. The participant was then informed that he (or she)
had been matched with another person, randomly selected among the clients in PRIDE
TANZANIA in Tanzania (i.e. you), and was asked to decide how much of his earnings he
wanted to give to you. Before he made his choice, he was shown a copy of this letter. He
decided to give you x NOK (equivalent to y USD), which is enclosed to this letter. If the
envelope does not contain any money, however, the participant decided not to give you
any of the money that the two of you had earned.”
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contrast to T1, the recipient in T3 could be seen as having greater need for
the money, also a moral argument that could motivate sharing.
The second treatment variation manipulated the information given to the
recipient. The treatments T1*-T3* correspond to treatments T1-T3 in all
respects, except for the recipient not receiving any information about the
context and the decision made by the dictator. The non-informative letter
accompanying any money transferred would only state the following basic
information: “You have been selected to receive x NOK from an economic
experiment conducted at the Norwegian School of Economics (NHH).” Thus,
the recipient would not know that the money he received reflected a choice
made by another person or have any information about the amount of money
actually available in this experiment.11 If extrinsic social motivation is an
important source of motivation in the dictator game, we would expect to
see less sharing in the treatments in which no information was given to the
recipient.
Table 3.1 summarizes the six treatments in the experiment. By compar-
ing treatment T1* to treatments T2*-T3*, we can study whether the intro-
duction of a moral argument in itself provides motivation for sharing, since
in these treatments we have excluded the possibility that the dictator gives
away money because her decision is observed by an anonymous recipient.
By comparing treatments T1-T3 to the corresponding treatments T1*-T3*,
we can study whether social concerns motivate sharing in the dictator game,
since the only difference across these two sets of treatments is the information
given to the recipient. In particular, we can study the role of information
both in a situation where there is no obvious moral argument for sharing,
by comparing T1 and T1*, and in situations where there are clearly moral
arguments for sharing, by comparing T2-T3 and T2*-T3*.
[ Table 3.1 about here. ]
In the second part of the experiment, to shed some further light on the
external social motive for sharing, we announced that the dictators had the
11If the dictator decided not to send any money in these treatments, we did not send a
letter to the recipient. This is just an extreme version of the recipient not being given any
information about the context and the dictator’s decision.
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opportunity to switch to the other information condition.12 Dictators in the
treatments T1-T3 were given the opportunity to choose that no information
would be given to the recipient and dictators in the treatments T1*-T3* were
given the opportunity to choose that complete information would be given
to the recipient. The dictators were also told that they could revise their
dictator decision, if they decided to switch to the other information condition.
Dictators who decided not to switch, were asked the hypothetical question of
what they would have transferred to the recipient if they had been presented
with the other information condition initially. If an underlying motivation
for sharing when the decision is observed by a recipient is to reduce guilt and
shame, we would expect some participants in treatments T1-T3 to change to
the no information condition. Correspondingly, if an underlying motivational
factor for sharing in social situations is social esteem and pride, then we
should expect some participants in treatments T1*-T3* to change to the
complete information condition.
In the final part of the experiment, the dictators were asked background
questions about their age, years of business training, gender, political pref-
erences, and charitable giving. They were, on average, 22 years old, had
two years of business training, and 35% of them were females. The reported
political preferences show less support for the left-wing coalition government
than in the population at large, which is as expected at a business school.13
On charitable giving, 67.5% reported having donated less than 500 NOK in
the previous year, and 32.5% reported having donated 500 NOK or more.
By comparing share given to self-reported political preferences and charita-
ble donations, we can study whether generous lab behavior is associated with
particular political views or generous behavior outside the lab.
12The announcement was completely unexpected for the dictators, so the introduction of
this possibility could not have affected their initial dictator choices. This is also consistent
with the anonymous comments given by the participants, where no one mentions that they
had foreseen this possibility.
1323.5% reported having voted for the left-wing coalition government in the previous
election, 17.5% for centrist parties, 54.5% for right-wing parties, 1.5% for other parties,
and 3% did not respond to this question.
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2.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 2.2 reports the average share given in each of the six treatments. Look-
ing first at the left column, we observe that participants matched with stu-
dents who have not worked give away 11.6% when the recipient receives no
information (T1*). As shown in Figure 2.1, a large majority of the partic-
ipants do not share anything in this treatment, and many of them explain
this by the absence of a moral argument for giving. In particular, the partici-
pants highlight the absence of an entitlement motive, “The other participant
has not done anything to deserve the money” (participant 20), but some also
mentioned the absence of a needs motive, “[The] other participant is most
likely not in economic need” (participant 103).14 In contrast, only a few
students motivate their choice by reference to selfish considerations, partici-
pant 91 being an exception, “I wanted to keep as much as possible myself.”15
Thus, in this treatment, most participants seem to find moral and selfish
considerations to be aligned and to justify not giving away anything.
[ Table 2.2 about here. ]
[ Figure 2.1 about here. ]
The other two treatments with no information given to the recipient in-
troduce moral arguments for giving, i.e. entitlements and needs, and in both
cases the average share given increases considerably. When the recipient is
another student who can also be seen as having entitlements to the money
that is to be distributed (T2*), we observe from Table 2.2 that share given
increases to 21%; when the recipient is a needy microcredit client (T3*), the
share increases to 43.3%. Furthermore, when comparing T1* and T2* in
Figure 2.1, we observe a substantial decrease in the average share of par-
ticipants keeping everything for themselves (from 65.7% to 51.5%) and a
corresponding increase in the average share of equal splits (from 8.6% to
14The explanations are translated from Norwegian.
15We observe from Figure 2.1 that one participant gives away everything in this treat-
ment, explaining this by reference to the following exotic consideration, “Karma. It is
rewarding to be generous” (participant 263).
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27.2%). The equal splits are, typically, motivated by entitlement consider-
ations, “We have done the same job and therefore each of us deserves half
of the money” (participant 22). In contrast, the most striking feature when
comparing T1* and T3* is the large increase in the share of participants giv-
ing away everything (from 0.3% to 26.7%), which is explained by reference
to the other person being more needy, “I feel that the person in Tanzania
has more need for the money than I have” (participant 295). In sum, the ob-
served treatment differences and the explanations of the participants provide
evidence of entitlements and needs considerations being crucial in motivat-
ing their behavior, even in situations where the recipient has no information
at all about the distributive situation and the choice made by the dictator.
Interestingly, in contrast to the baseline treatment, many participants also
include selfish considerations in the explanation of their choice when there
is a moral argument for sharing. This suggests that the dictators in these
treatments engage in a trade-off between moral and selfish considerations
when deciding how much to share with the recipients. The explanation of
participant 106, who gave away 50 NOK in T2*, may serve as an illustration
of this line of reasoning, “My choice was based on selfish reasoning, where I
asked myself ‘What do I get out of this?’ Still the other person has done a
job, and deserves some form of reward.”
By comparing the left and right columns in Table 2.2, we can study the
causal impact of information on share given. Interestingly, we observe that
giving the recipient information about the context and the dictator’s decision
does not increase share given in the baseline treatment (T1 versus T1*),
11.6% versus 11.4%, and the explanation of participant 384 sheds light on
why this is the case, “I see no reason for giving anything to the other person.
I am the one who has signed up for the experiment and I am therefore of
the opinion that I deserve all the money. This I consider fair and I have no
problem being open about it.” Thus, as long as the participants consider it
morally unproblematic not to give away money, the information provided to
the recipient appears to be of minor importance.16
16The finding in T1* is in line with Cherry et al. (2002), who show that dictators genear-
lly are unwilling to share when bargaining over money that they have earned themselves.
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In the treatments where there is a moral argument for sharing, on the
other hand, information appears powerful and increases average share given:
from 21.0% to 29.3% when comparing T2* and T2, and from 43.3% to 60.2%
when comparing T3* and T3. This shows that information provided to an
anonymous recipient matters for dictators, in line with the explanation of
participant 236 who divided equally in T2, “This was the fair division for
both participants, i.e., myself and the other part. The fact that she would
know that the money comes from me strengthens my decision not to take
all the money myself,” and by participant 190 in T3, who gave away 75%,
“I felt that taking everything for myself would hurt the person receiving the
letter, and it would have been unethical of me since he or she was in greater
need for the money.” Thus, the role of information appears to interact with
the presence of a moral argument for sharing; information only motivates
behavior in the presence of a moral argument.
2.4 Intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation
Table 2.3 presents regressions where the dependent variable is the share given
by the dictator. To focus on the relative importance of introducing a moral
argument and information, respectively, we introduce two dummy variables,
“Moral” and “Information,” where “Moral” takes the value one in the treat-
ments where there is a moral argument for sharing (T2, T2*,T3, T3*) and
“Information” takes the value one in the treatments where the recipient re-
ceived complete information (T1,T2,T3).
[ Table 2.3 about here. ]
Columns 1-3 confirm the impression from the descriptive analysis. The
introduction of a moral argument for sharing has in itself a large and signif-
icant effect on the share given, it increases from 11% in the baseline to 38%
in the treatments where there is a moral argument for sharing (p < 0.001,
Our experimental data, however, suggests that this behavior does not reflect selfishness,
but rather the absence of a moral argument for sharing and the presence of a moral
entitlement argument for keeping all the money.
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“Moral” in column 1). The introduction of information also increases the
share given, from 24% in the treatments where the recipient receives no in-
formation to 32% in the treatments where the recipient receives complete
information (p = 0.096, “Information” in column 2). This effect, however,
is completely driven by the treatments where there is a moral argument for
sharing. As can be seen from column 3, the effect of information in the base-
line treatment is negligible (p = 0.981, “Information” in column 3), whereas it
is substantial and statistically significant in the moral treatments (p = 0.053,
“Information” + “Moral × Information” in column 3). The estimated in-
teraction effect “Moral × Information” is almost identical to the effect of
information in the treatments where there is a moral argument for sharing,
but only close to statistically significant (p = 0.12, “Moral × Information” in
column 3). Overall, the regressions in columns 1-3 show that intrinsic moral
motivation is crucial for explaining sharing behavior in the dictator game,
but also that extrinsic social motivation creates a crowding-in effect when
there is a moral argument for sharing and the recipient is given information
about the context and the decision made by the dictator.
In column 4, we introduce self-reported background variables, which only
marginally affect the estimated treatment effects. Interestingly, we observe
a positive association between the share given and both charitable giving
outside the lab and political preferences. Participants who report donating
500 NOK or more to charity the previous year give, on average, 8 percentage
points more to the other participant (p = 0.137, “Charity” in column 4)
and participants reporting that they voted for the left-wing coalition govern-
ment in the last election give away, on average, 10 percentage points more
(p = 0.078, “Left-wing” in column 4). As shown in column 5, these as-
sociations become even stronger when we only consider the no information
treatments (p = 0.046 and p = 0.052, “Charity” and “Left-wing” in column
5), the charitable and left-wing individuals then give away almost twice as
much as the rest of the participants. This suggests that sharing behavior
in the no information treatments reflects an intrinsic moral motivation that
also motivates charitable giving outside the lab and voting behavior. In the
complete information treatments there is no such association, as observed in
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column 6.
With respect to age and years of business training, we only find an associa-
tion when complete information is given to the recipient. In these treatments,
there is a significant negative association between the share given and years
of business training and a significant positive association between the share
given and age (p < 0.001 and p < 0.001, “Business training” and “Age” in
column 6). There is no such association in the no information treatments,
which suggests that business training and age, in opposite directions, signif-
icantly affect the extrinsic social motive for sharing but have no impact on
the intrinsic moral motivation. Finally, we observe that the estimated gender
coefficient is small and insignificant in all specifications.
In sum, the regressions in 4-6 show that the sharing behavior in the ex-
periment is associated with behavior outside the lab and personal character-
istics, but also highlights that these associations are sensitive to the presence
of extrinsic social motivation.
2.5 Opting in and out of information
When introducing the opportunity to switch to the other information condi-
tion, we observe that some dictators prefer the recipient to receive complete
information, whereas others prefer that the recipient receives no informa-
tion. As shown in Table 3.5, 43.1% of the participants in the treatments
T1-T3 decide to change to the no information condition, and 44.9% of the
participants in the treatments T1*-T3* decide to change to the complete in-
formation condition. In their justifications, the participants provide a wide
range of reasons for their choices, including guilt and shame among those
who decide to go from complete information to no information, and social
esteem and pride among those who decide to go from no information to com-
plete information. A share of the participants also voice the right to privacy
as an argument for changing to the no information condition and the right
to information (on behalf of the receiver) as an argument for changing to the
complete information condition.
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[ Table 3.5 about here. ]
Table 2.5 shows that the choice of information condition is systematically
related to the share given in all treatments. The participants who decide
to change to the no information condition give, on average, a much lower
share than the rest, 21.9% versus 40.8% (p = 0.004, Mann-Whitney test of
equality), whereas the participants who decide to change to the complete
information condition give, on average, a much higher share than the rest,
30.2% versus 19.8% (p = 0.104, Mann-Whitney test of equality). These pat-
terns suggest that different types of extrinsic social motivation are important
for understanding behavior in the dictator game. A reasonable interpretation
of the observed patterns is that some of the participants who give away a
small share decide not to inform the recipient in order to avoid feelings of
guilt and shame and some of the participants who give away a large share
decide to inform the recipient to invoke feelings of social esteem and pride.
[ Table 2.5 about here. ]
Overall, very few of the participants who decide to switch to the complete
information condition revise their initial dictator decision, 13.6% in T1-T3
and 11.3% in T1*-T3*, and as a result the revision in average share given is
also marginal, from 21.9% to 20.5% in T1*-T3* and from 30.2% to 30.8% in
T1-T3.17 The fact that so few participants revise their dictator choices when
given the opportunity to do so suggests that the initial decision has a powerful
anchoring effect, which by most participants is justified by arguing that one
should stand by one’s decisions. This is also reflected in the responses of
the participants who do not take the opportunity to change the information
condition. To the hypothetical question of what they would have given away
if they had faced the other information condition initially, these participants
give answers that are very close to what they did in the dictator decision.
17Only 2 out of the 75 dictators who give away a positive share in the treatments T1*-




The present study shows that intrinsic moral motivation is fundamental in
explaining dictator game behavior, and that extrinsic social motivation only
plays a role when there is a moral argument for sharing. In these cases, we
observe a crowding-in effect of the extrinsic social motive, where both feelings
of guilt and shame and of social esteem and pride seem to motivate sharing.
Our findings can shed light on why people in some cases prefer to avoid
a sharing situation. It is commonly argued that dictator behavior reflects
reluctant sharing, since many dictators prefer to avoid the sharing situation
if given the opportunity to do so (Dana et al., 2006, 2007; Broberg et al., 2007;
Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Lazear et al., 2012). For example, Dana et al.
(2006) present results from an experiment where the participants are first
asked to share 10 USD in a dictator game. After making their decision the
dictators are offered an exit option where they receive 9 USD and the recipient
stays uninformed and receives nothing. If the decision in the dictator game
solely reflects intrinsic moral motivation, no participant should choose the
exit option, as it is dominated in monetary payoffs by the dictator game.
However, they find that a substantial fraction of the participants exit. How
can this be explained? Our study suggests that this may reflect feelings
of guilt and shame, but also highlights that the decision to exit does not
necessarily reflect a reluctance to share with the recipient. In Dana et al.
(2006), the dictator is only given the choice between sharing (in line with
the initial dictator choice, and in which case the recipient is informed) and
not sharing, in which case the recipient is not informed about the situation.
In such a setting, it is not possible to infer how much of the initial sharing
was driven by extrinsic social motivation. In the present study, we separate
these two dimensions, by allowing dictators who prefer not to inform the
recipients to still share with them. Strikingly, we observe very little reluctant
sharing, most dictators who prefer not to inform the recipient of their choice
nevertheless give away a substantial share of the money.
The present experiment can also shed some light on pro-social behavior
outside the lab. In a novel field experiment on charitable giving in the US,
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DellaVigna et al. (2012) show that social pressure is an important determi-
nant of door-to-door household giving. Some of the patterns observed in this
field experiment are in line with the observed behavior in the present study.
First, they find that social pressure has greater effect for a local charity that
is highly valued in the community than for an out-of-state charity, which
corresponds to our finding that extrinsic social motivation plays a more im-
portant role when the dictator perceives that there is a moral argument for
giving. Second, they observe that when a flyer with an opt-out opportunity
is distributed in advance, households who give small donations prefer not
to open the door, which corresponds to our observation that dictators who
give a small share prefer not to inform the recipient about their generosity.
Third, they observe that the opt-out flyer increases large donations, in line
with what we should expect from the present experiment, where we observe
that some dictators who give away a large share prefer to inform the re-
cipient. This last point also suggests that the positive utility some people
derive from being observed donating should be taken into account in welfare
calculations of charitable door-to-door campaigns.
Finally, the present experiment highlights the fact that when studying
whether lab behavior is associated with behavior outside the lab, it is impor-
tant to have a clear understanding of the motivational forces at play in the
experiment. In the treatments where the recipient is informed, there is no
clear association between generous behavior in the lab and charitable giving
outside the lab. This association only appears in the treatments that isolate
the intrinsic moral motive for giving, in which we observe that dictators who
give away more also report donating more to charitable organizations. Our
design also reveals that intrinsically morally motivated individuals are not
necessarily generous in the lab, they are only so if there is a moral argument
for sharing, and even more if there is also an extrinsic social motive at play.
Thus, the interaction between intrinsic moral motivation and extrinsic social
motivation is essential for understanding moral behavior, both inside and
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of share given
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Note: The panels show, by treatment, the distribution of the share given by





Student – not working T1* (n=35) T1 (n=36)
Student – working T2* (n=33) T2 (n=34)
Client – needy T3* (n=30) T3 (n=32)
Note: The table presents the six treatments in the study. Recipient refers to the
characteristics of the recipient: “Student – not working” means that the recipient
was another student who had not been working, “Student – not working” means
that the recipient was another student who had been working, and “Client – needy”
means that the recipient was a microfinance client from Tanzania. Information
refers to the information condition, where “no” means that the recipient received
no information about the context and decision made by the dictator and “com-
plete” means that the recipient received complete information about the context
and decision made by the dictator. The number of participants in each treatment
is given by the number in parenthesis.
Table 2.2: Treatment differences: Share given
Information
Recipient no complete
Student – not working 0.116 0.114
(0.037) (0.034)
Student – working 0.210 0.293
(0.046) (0.055)




Note: The table shows average share given by treatment. The treatments are
defined in Table 3.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2.3: Regression analysis
All treatments T1*-T3* T1-T3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Moral 0.27∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)




Charity 0.08∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.03
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
Left-wing 0.10∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.06
(0.05) (0.08) (0.07)
Female 0.03 -0.01 0.04
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
Age 0.04∗∗∗ 0.00 0.09∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Business training -0.08∗∗∗ -0.03 -0.13∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Constant 0.11∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗ -0.69∗∗ 0.03 -1.45∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.28) (0.39) (0.40)
Information + Moral×Information 0.13∗∗ 0.14∗∗
(0.06) (0.05)
Observations 200 200 200 200 98 102
R2 0.135 0.014 0.157 0.239 0.188 0.334
Note: The table reports regressions where the dependent variable is the share given
by the dictator. Columns (1)-(4) include all observations, column (5) includes all
observations from treatments T1*-T3*, and column (6) includes all observations
from treatments T1-T3. The treatments are defined in Table 3.1. ’Moral’ is a
dummy taking the value one if the dictator is in the treatments T2, T2*, T3, T3*,
’Information’ is a dummy taking the value one if the dictator is in the treatments
T1-T3, ’Charity’ is a dummy taking the value one if the dictator has given 500 NOK
or more to charitable organizations in the previous year, ’Left-wing’ is a dummy
taking the value one if the dictator voted for a party in the left-wing coalition
government in the previous election, ’Female’ is a dummy taking the value one if the
dictator is a female, ’Age’ is the age of the dictator in years, ’Business training’ is
years of business training of the dictator, and ’Information + Moral×Information’
is the linear combination of Information and Moral×Information. Standard errors
in parentheses (∗ : p < 0.10, ∗∗ : p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ : p < 0.01).
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Note: The table reports, by treatment, the share of individuals that switched to the
other information condition. The treatments are defined in Table 3.1. Standard
errors in parentheses.
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Table 2.5: Who opt in and out?
Who opt in and out?













Total 0.307 0.219 0.302
(0.032) (0.053) (0.053)
Note: The table reports the share given in the distributive choice, by treatment
and by the choice of whether to switch to the other information condition. The
treatments are defined in Table 3.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
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2.7 Appendix
This document contains a translation of the instructions, screenshots, and
letters that could be sent after the experiment.
Since the experiment was conducted using a web platform, the actual
layout on the participant’s computers could vary depending on the screen
resolution and magnification (user adjustable).
With the exception of a short text that was read in the beginning of
the experiment, instructions were presented on screen, and the leader of
the experiment only encouraged the participants to follow these on-screen
instructions. We enclose screenshots from the T2 treatment. Differences in
screenshots between the T2 treatment and the others are explained in the
paper. Full translations of the remaining letters are enclosed at the end.
2.7.1 Introduction to the experiment
Welcome to this experiment. My name is X and I shall be in charge of the
experiment.
The results from this experiment will be used in a research project, and
it is important that everyone follows the rules of conduct given to you. If
you have questions or problems along the way, please raise your hand and we
will come to you. You must not attempt to open other web-pages than those
of the experiment. If you break these rules, you must leave the room. There
will be waiting periods during the experiment, and it is important that your
remain quiet in these.
You will be anonymous in the experiment.18 It won’t be possible for us,
the other participants, or anyone else to find out what choices you make in
the experiment.
When the experiment is finished, you will be given a payment code on
the screen. You should write this code down on a form at your workstation.
When you leave the room after the experiment, you will present this form,
and you will be given an envelope with the money you have earned. The
18The text in italics, here and further down, was only read to the dictators.
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envelope will be prepared by persons who will not be in this room when the
envelopes are distributed. We do this to make sure that no-one will know how
much each of you earned in this experiment.
The experiment has two parts, and I shall know explain what you will do
in the experiment.
The first thing you shall do in this experiment is to work on a task that
lasts for 15 minutes. The task is to find a certain number in a matrix with
a large number of different numbers. You get one point each time you tick
off the correct number in the table and you lose one point each time you
tick off a wrong number. You can move to a new matrix at any time. You
must collect 70 points within the time limit to complete the task. You will
be informed about your number of points during the task.
If you finish the task before the time limit you will be told so. You can
then relax and await further information.
Raise a hand if you have not understood the instructions . . .
Now everyone have understood the instructions, and you will soon be
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esteem in China: Evidence
from a real effort dictator game
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Abstract: This paper studies how concerns for fairness arguments and
receiver awareness interact when Chinese business students play a modified
dictator game. The dictators give more to poor receivers than to their peers,
but whether the receivers will be informed or not about the decision process
has no statistically significant impact on average offers. When the dictators
are surprised with an option to change the receivers’ information, the in-
formation choices are consistent with the dictators being motivated by guilt
aversion and social esteem. The results are discussed in light of previously
obtained results from a study conducted at a business school in Norway.
3.1 Introduction
To what extent do people share in dictator games2 because they are fair-
minded, and to what extent are people merely concerned with wanting to
appear as fair-minded? A series of recent papers (Dana et al., 2006; Broberg
et al., 2007; Lazear et al., 2012; Cappelen, Halvorsen, Sørensen, and Tun-
godden, 2012) have shown that dictators are likely to share more when the
receiver is aware of the choice situation, compared to when the receiver is
uninformed. Standard social preference models (i.e., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999;
Sobel, 2005; Cappelen et al., 2007) can not explain this tendency, because
they implicitly assume that the receiver’s information is irrelevant to the dic-
tator. As a consequence, researchers and policymakers relying on the stan-
dard models may faultily attribute socially motivated generosity to private
fairness preferences.
Even in double blind experiments, where neither the researchers nor other
participants are able to infer the actions of a particular dictator, there are
reasons to believe that the receivers’ information is relevant to the dictators.
One reason is that dictators may be guilt averse (Dufwenberg and Gneezy,
2000; Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007).
That is, dictators may wish to avoid disappointing their receiver with respect
to what the receiver expects to get. A second reason is that dictators may
2The dictator game is an experiment in which some participants are given the authority
to decide the experimental outcome of another party.
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be motivated by utility arising from signaling to the receiver that the sender
is a fair-minded person (Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009). Even if the receiver
will never learn the identity of the dictator, the dictator may wish to convey
the message that fairness is important to some people.3 Third, a dictator
may also wish to give the receiver a positive surprise by sharing more than
he believes that the receiver expects, so that the receiver may think highly
of him. To the extent that sharing occurs because the dictator enjoys a
feeling of being esteemed by others, his actions can be said to be driven by
a preference for pride (Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008b).
If a receiver is unaware that he may receive money, then there is little
reason to think that he expects to receive anything. In this case, any amount
that the dictator decides to share (including zero) is unlikely to disappoint.
The situation, however, changes with informed receivers, since dictators now
have valid reasons to believe that the receivers expect the dictator to share.4
For example, substantial evidence from previous dictator games shows that
positive offers occur frequently in this setting (Camerer, 2003; Engel, 2011).
In order to investigate the relative importance of intrinsic moral moti-
vation and extrinsic social motivation, Cappelen et al. (2012) conducted a
dictator game in Bergen, Norway, where we modified both the fairness claims
of the receivers, as well as whether the receivers would be informed about
the decision process or not. The results from that experiment were consis-
tent with the view that information given to the receiver does influence the
dictators’ generosity, but the majority of sharing appeared to stem from con-
cerns about the fairness claims. In addition, information had no impact on
generosity when the receiver had no obvious claim to the money.
While the experimental design was especially suited for studying the in-
fluence of social motivation, one might argue that it is not surprising that
it was found to play a relatively small role in the individualistic society of
3Without information about the decision process it is impossible for the receiver to
identify intent, and this may affect the perceived value of the transfer. For example,
Blount (1995) and Charness (2004) find that receivers appreciate gifts more when they
are given voluntarily rather than exogenously.
4To see how a receiver could possibly expect to get anything, one has to depart from
the common game theoretical assumption that every person only cares about his own
materialistic outcome.
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Norway.5 In individualistic societies, people generally have greater freedom
to act out their private desires, as they are less bound to the social groups to
which they belong. By contrast, group loyalty plays a larger role in collec-
tivist societies. It may therefore be the case that people are more reluctant
to deviate from others’ expectations, and that receiver awareness is more
important, in collectivist societies. This is an important question because,
as noted by Hofstede et al. (2010), “the vast majority of people in our world
live in societies in which the interest of the group prevails over the interest
of the individual.”
Motivated by this concern, I modified the dictator game experiment per-
formed by Cappelen et al. (2012) and conducted it with students from Shang-
hai Jiao Tong University (SJTU) Antai College of Economics and Manage-
ment (Antai) in Shanghai, China.6 By translating the instructions and the
computer program from the original experiment, I obtained data that are
highly comparable with those previously obtained at the Norwegian School
of Economics (NHH).
There are several reasons why it is interesting to conduct the experi-
ment in China. First, social anthropologists often highlight the importance
of “face” (mianzi), a concept that is closely related to social esteem, in this
country (Yutang, 1935; Pye, 1992; Kristoffersen, 2010). Second, in response
to the World Values Survey statement “I make a lot of effort to live up to what
my friends expect,” the modal answer from Chinese respondents was “agree,”
while the modal answer from the Norwegian respondents was “strongly dis-
agree.”7 Third, China’s rapidly increasing economic significance generates a
need to understand the motivations behind the economic decisions made by
their elite business students.
The results of the experiment show that receiver awareness does not af-
fect average offers in a statistically significant way. This finding is contrary
to both the research hypothesis and the results obtained in Norway. Af-
ter the dictators made their allocation choice, they were allowed to decide
5Norway is ranked as having the seventeenth most individualistic culture, out of 76
countries and regions, by Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov (2010).
6China is ranked at number 58 in Hofstede’s individualism index.
7WVS 2005–2008 (most recent), question V66, http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/.
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whether the receiver should be given detailed information about the decision
process or not. The information decisions show that the likelihood of the re-
ceiver getting detailed information is positively correlated with the amount
of money that the dictator chose to give. This behavior is consistent with the
idea that dictators are motivated by both guilt aversion and pride. Potential
explanations for the seemingly contradictory behavior in the allocation and
information decisions are discussed below.
The paper proceeds in the next section with a presentation of the experi-
mental design and the cross-cultural controls. Section 4.4 presents the results,




The experiment is a modified version of the real effort dictator game devel-
oped by Cappelen et al. (2012). As illustrated in figure 3.1, the experiment
consists of five stages, and each participant makes three decisions. In addi-
tion to earning and distributing an endowment, the dictators are asked to
decide how much information the receivers will get. The treatments form
a 2 × 2 matrix with the dimensions being the receivers’ neediness and the
receivers’ information about the decision process. Table 3.1 shows that the
number of observations in each treatment is about the same in both the cur-
rent (Antai) and the original (NHH) experiment.
[Figure 3.1 about here.]
[Table 3.1 about here.]
The experimental sessions took place in a computer laboratory at the
SJTU Smith Experimental Economics Research Center (SSEERC) in Novem-
ber 2010. A total of 135 participants were recruited from undergraduate lec-
84
tures at Antai. Each of the participants was only permitted to attend once,
and none of the participants had any prior experience with economic exper-
iments. The participants sat in private cubicles throughout the experiment,
and all interaction took place through a web-browser interface.
Seven sessions were conducted over two consecutive days, with all four
treatments randomized within each session. Each session lasted about 45 to
55 minutes. The participants were asked not to discuss the experiment with
anyone, and there are no statistically significant differences in the behavior
between the first and the second day.
3.2.2 The production and allocation of earnings
At the initial stage, the dictators were asked to perform a task on a computer.
The task entailed generating points by identifying and checking of three-digit
numbers in matrixes.8 If a dictator reached the target threshold, set to 70
points, within a 15 minute deadline, he was told that he had earned 40 RMB
(≈ 6 USD) and that he could share this money with another person. The
information given about the receiving individual differed according to which
treatment the dictator is assigned to.9
The receiving individuals were people whom were randomly chosen from
lists of candidates, and were not contacted prior to the experiment. As a
consequence, they did not participate in any other way except from acting
as (potential) recipients for the dictators. While the researchers knew the
full name and contact information of every receiver, this information was not
disclosed to the dictators. The dictators and the receivers thus remained
anonymous toward each other.
3.2.3 Treatment variations
In the treatments with informed receivers, the dictators were told that the
receiver would be given an envelope containing a letter and the money that he
decided to give. The letter explained that an economic experiment had been
8A screen shot of the production task is included in the appendix.
9The participants were not told that there were multiple treatments.
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conducted at Antai, and that the receiver of the letter was randomly chosen.
It stated that an Antai student had earned 40 RMB on a task, and that
this person was free to decide the distribution of the money between him-
or herself and the receiver. The letter also mentioned that the participant
was shown a copy of the letter before deciding how much to give, and that
if there was no money in the envelope it was because the participant chose
not to give anything.
In the no-information treatments, the receivers were only given a very
brief letter. This letter contained the same opening and ending as the detailed
letter, but gave no details about where the money came from. The letters
to the uninformed receivers simply stated that there had been an economic
experiment at Antai, and that the receiver was randomly chosen. In these
treatments, the dictators were informed that if they chose not to give away
any money, then the receiver would also not get a letter.
To improve the credibility of the experiment, the dictators were told that
they could receive an anonymized copy of the actual letter, as well as a receipt
as proof of the transaction, by contacting the lab administration via e-mail
after the session.10 The dictators then had to view a full-screen picture of the
relevant letter before proceeding to decide upon the allocation of the money.
An important finding in Cappelen et al. (2012) was that receiver aware-
ness appeared to only play a role in allocation decisions where the dicta-
tor was given a clear reason for sharing his money. To investigate whether
the Chinese students make similar considerations, the receivers were chosen
from two different populations. One group of receivers consisted of ran-
dom students from the same business school as the dictators. In these peer-
treatments, the production task was intended to function as a legitimizing
mechanism that the dictator could use as rationale to convince himself that
it would be fair for him to keep all of the money (Konow, 1996, 2000; Cherry
et al., 2002; Cappelen et al., 2010).
The second group of receivers consisted of random pupils at Yigang Mid-
dle School (Yigang), located in an economically disadvantaged region in
10No such requests were made at Antai, compared with only one request in the NHH
experiment.
86
Gansu Province. The dictators were informed that this particular school
receives educational support from the Siyuan Commonweal Organization, a
charitable organization affiliated with the SJTU.11 In an effort to minimize
the differences between the treatments, the dictators who were matched with
Yigang pupils also had to pass the production task in order to have money
to allocate. Even though the receiving pupils were not asked to perform the
production task, the differences in future prospects between the Antai stu-
dents and the Yigang pupils suggests that the latter needed the money more
and therefore deserved a share.
In the treatment overview in table 3.1, U-P and I-P refer to the treat-
ments where the receivers are peer students from the same business school
as the dictators. The treatments in which the receivers are needy persons
are referred to as U-N and I-N.12 The Us denote the treatments in which the
cover letter contains limited information about the experiment, leaving the
receivers uninformed about the decision process, while the Is denote receivers
who would be informed of the process behind the transfer.
3.2.4 The information and revision decisions
The initial allocation decisions offer insight as to what extent receiver aware-
ness motivates generosity, but they do not provide information about the
relative influences of guilt aversion and pride. One way to differentiate be-
tween these two concerns is to exploit the fact that that guilt aversion makes
it preferable for the dictator that the receiver remain unaware, while the
sensation of being esteemed requires that the receiver learn about the exper-
iment. This distinction is exploited in the experimental design by surprising
the dictators with an information choice.
11The Siyuan Commonweal Organization helped deliver the experimental payments to
the receivers at Yigang Middle School.
12In addition to using peer and needy receivers, Cappelen et al. (2012) had treatments
with entitled peer receivers who performed the same earning task as the dictators. Entitled
peer receivers are relatively costly in terms of the required experimental facilities and
participation compensation. Additionally, the original experiment showed that need-based
entitlements can be a stronger motivation for giving than merit-based entitlements. For
these reasons, the treatments with entitled peer receivers were omitted from the current
study.
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After confirming their allocation decision, the dictators were given an
option to change the content of their cover letter. Both the informative and
the uninformative versions of the letter were displayed, and the dictators
were asked to choose one of the letters to be used. If they chose to change
their letter, they were also given the opportunity to revise their allocation
decision. Dictators who chose not to change their letter were asked to state
how much they would have given in the hypothetical situation where the
other letter was to be used. This way, the required effort remained the same
regardless of whether the letter was changed or not. As in the initial stage,
the dictators were told that the uninformative letter would only be sent if the
dictator chose to give away any money, while the informative letter would be
sent regardless of whether there was any money in the envelope.
3.2.5 Payments
Cash payments for the dictators were prepared in envelopes by assistants in
a separate room and were handed out based on computer-generated codes
without the presence of those assistants. While single Chinese Yuan are
available as both bills and coins, participants were paid exclusively in bills
to avoid jingling coins from revealing non-selfish dictators. This way, no one
was able to identify the actions of any specific participant, and participants
were made aware of this fact before the experiment began.
3.2.6 Cross-cultural controls
Following Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Zamir (1991), the experi-
mental design was edited with respect to the language, the stakes, and the
experimenters in order to reduce the potential for confounding influences. In
addition, special care was taken to maintain the comparability of the subject
pools (Croson and Buchan, 1999).
Language effects were mitigated by involving separate parties in a two-
way translation of the experimental instructions. The Norwegian instructions
were initially translated into English before they were translated into Man-
darin. The reverse translation was done by an assistant who is fluent in both
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Mandarin and English, and familiar with Norwegian. Minor discrepancies
between the versions were worked out in cooperation with the author, with
particular effort to ensure the Mandarin version did not sound like a trans-
lation from a foreign text. As in the NHH experiment, the letters that were
sent to the receivers were printed on paper containing the official letterhead
of the school that the participants were recruited from. This was apparent
in the pictures of the letters displayed to the dictators.
In the NHH experiment, participants received 100 NOK (≈ 17 USD)
to cover the alternative cost of participation, and earned an additional 200
NOK in the production phase. In the SJTU version, show-up compensation
was set to 10 RMB (≈ 1.5 USD). In both countries, the show-up compen-
sation approximated the net hourly wage for students doing part-time work
in local shops. The experimental endowment was changed to 40 RMB. This
is lower than what a direct purchasing power parity conversion would sug-
gest, reflecting the subsidized costs of living and eating on campus. The
experimental endowment was about twice the amount normally paid to par-
ticipants in experiments at the SSEERC, and can be regarded as salient to
the participants.
Only native assistants were used to collect the data. The assistants
trained with one of the conductors of the original NHH-experiment (the au-
thor) in trial sessions without subjects. Strict adherence to a written protocol
aided in ensuring that the sessions unfolded in similar ways in both labs. The
Norwegian researcher stayed out of sight during the entire experiment.
The original experiment of Cappelen et al. (2012) was conducted on busi-
ness students. Because there is a concern that business students may behave
atypically in economic experiments due to selection or training (Marwell and
Ames, 1981), it was deemed preferable that the Chinese sample had a com-
parable educational background. The master’s in management programs at
Antai and NHH were both ranked by the Financial Times newspaper as
among the top 50 programs in the world, in 2009 and 2010. They were also
the highest-ranking master’s in management programs in their respective
countries.13 These similarities suggest that both the topical and the qualita-
13The Financial Times rankings can be found online here:
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To facilitate comparison with the original Cappelen et al. (2012) experiment,
the relevant results from NHH are presented alongside the results from An-
tai. Table 3.2 shows that the Antai participants were about 2.5 years younger
on average than the NHH participants. They had been engaged with their
studies for 1.1 years less than the Norwegian sample on average, and while
only 33.1% were female in the NHH sample, that proportion was 59.3% at
Antai.14 The difference in average age and years of study is primarily due to
graduate students being invited to attend the experiment at NHH, but not
at Antai.15
[Table 3.2 about here.]
3.3.2 The dictator decision
The average initial allocations are reported in table 3.3. The first thing to
notice is that the Chinese dictators gave away a considerable share of their
earned money in the treatment with uninformed peer receivers. On aver-
age, these receivers were awarded 20.1% of the earnings. In comparison, the
Norwegian dictators gave 11.6% of their endowment in this setting, a percent-
age which is statistically significantly lower (Mann-Whitney p-value=0.000).
http://rankings.ft.com/businessschoolrankings/masters-in-management-2009 and here:
http://rankings.ft.com/businessschoolrankings/masters-in-management-2010.
14These statistics for NHH only cover participants in the four treatments that were
included in the design of the experiment at Antai.
15Antai graduate lectures are located at a different campus than the undergraduate
lectures and the SSEERC laboratory. To limit the possibility that mismatches between
the cost and compensation for attendance could affect the results, graduate students were
not invited to participate.
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This observation could be interpreted as indicating that the Chinese business
students are more altruistic on average than their Norwegian counterparts.
It could also indicate that some of the Chinese dictators perceived that they
had fairness arguments for sharing, while the Norwegians perceived it differ-
ently.16
[Table 3.3 about here.]
[Table 3.4 about here.]
As expected, the average generosity increased when the receivers were
presented as being relatively poor. When looking at table 3.4, we see that
offers to the needy receivers were higher than offers to the peer receivers,
regardless of whether the accompanying letter was to be informative or not.
This pattern was also found in the Norwegian data. In the treatment with
uninformed needy receivers, the Chinese dictators offered to give 60.1% of
their earnings.17
Cappelen et al. (2012) concluded that receiver awareness increased aver-
age offers when the dictators felt there was a reason to share, and that it
had no effect on offers when it was seen as fair to keep the entire endow-
ment. This pattern is not evident in the data from China. In the Antai
results, there are no statistically significant effects of receiver awareness on
the average levels of sharing (see table 3.5). The informed peer receivers were
provided 23.5% of the pie, while the informed needy receivers obtained 57.6%.
[Table 3.5 about here.]
16In the follow-up questionnaire, eight individuals reported having some form of altruis-
tic motive for giving, while nine individuals commented that the receiver had a fair claim
on some of the money.
17Even though allocations to informed needy receivers are about 60% on average in both
the NHH and the Antai experiment, the underlying motivations may differ. In addition
to need, the Norwegian dictators may have been motivated by efficiency concerns as the
money sent to Tanzania would have higher buying power. On the other hand, the Chinese
receivers may have benefitted from smaller social distance (Dana et al., 2007) as they had
the same nationality as their dictators.
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While the average offers were not affected by the content of the cover
letter, sending detailed information appears to have had a positive effect
on the share of dictators choosing to distribute their earnings evenly. As is
illustrated in the histograms in figure 3.2, the effect is statistically significant
in the peer treatments (Pearson’s χ21 p-value = 0.003), but not in the need
treatments (Pearson’s χ21 p-value = 0.492). It is evident from figure 3.2 that
this effect did not occur with the Norwegian sample.
The popularity of the egalitarian division is in line with the Andreoni and
Bernheim (2009) model, which predicts that dictators will be eager to signal
their fair-mindedness by choosing the 50/50 split. The key conditions that
would incite this effect are that the receiver is given sufficient information
to derive his share, and that the 50/50 split is seen as a relevant fairness
ideal. Thus, it appears that a key difference between the Chinese and the
Norwegian sample is the fairness ideal adopted in the setting with peer re-
ceivers. This may also help to explain why average levels of sharing were
higher among the Chinese in this setting.
[Figure 3.2 about here.]
3.3.3 The information and revision decisions
Almost half (48.9%) of the dictators chose to change the content of their
cover letter (see table 3.6). Changes occurred frequently in all treatments,
but there was a tendency for the participants to prefer to inform the receivers
about the details of the experiment. In all, 60.7% of the Chinese students
chose to send the detailed letter, compared to the 47.4% of the NHH partic-
ipants who made the same choice.
[Table 3.6 about here.]
The opportunity to revise the allocation decision does not appear to have
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been an important motivation behind the letter changes. Table 3.7 shows
that the average changes in offers are small and not statistically significant.
Instead, the information decisions seem to be driven by guilt aversion and
pride considerations. Table 3.8 displays average initial offers, according to
what the dictators chose to do with their letter. It is clear that those who
chose to remove the detailed information gave less on average than those
who retained the detailed letter, and that those who added information gave
more on average than those who stayed with the uninformative letter. These
findings suggest that some participants who behaved relatively selfishly used
the information option as a way to avoid disappointing their receivers. Sim-
ilarly, the relatively generous dictators seemed to prefer that the receivers
appreciate their generosity. The same pattern is evident in the Norwegian
data.
[Table 3.7 about here.]
[Table 3.8 about here.]
3.4 Discussion
The results of the allocation and information decisions appear to provide
contradicting evidence on the role of receiver awareness. If the Chinese stu-
dents are concerned with how the receivers would interpret the transfers, as
their information decisions suggest, it is not obvious why this concern did
not affect the average offers in the first place. This section considers some
potential explanations in the hope of inspiring future research to resolve the
conundrum.
The fact that the average offer given to peer receivers did not change with
information, despite the increase in offers of 50%, implies that a polarization
of offers took place. It appears that some dictators were driven to reduce their
offer, while other dictators were increasing theirs. This heterogeneity can be
rationalized if one considers that the Chinese participants were torn between
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two different fairness ideals: equity and egalitarianism. The dictators may
have felt comfortable with balancing the ideals by offering a moderate amount
to uninformed receivers, while they may have felt forced to take a stand as to
which principle should dominate when confronted with informed receivers.
While some clearly opted for the egalitarian alternative, others may have
wished to emphasize the equity concerns. The Norwegians at NHH may have
escaped this dilemma all together if they perceived that their cultural norm
unambiguously identified equity as the dominating concern in this situation.
It is more difficult to explain the allocation choices in the need treat-
ments. One theory is that there may be a social stigma attached to receiving
a relatively large transfer.18 That is, it may be considered acceptable to re-
ceive money up to the level that is shared with peer receivers, while excess
amounts signals that the giver takes pity on the receiver. When detailed
information is given to the needy receivers, the social stigma effect may pro-
hibit the increased sharing that otherwise would occur because of guilt and
pride effects. To complete this line of reasoning so that it also encompasses
the NHH results, one could speculate that the Norwegian dictators paid less
attention to the social stigma effect, as their receivers were of a different
nationality.
Instead of asking why detailed information did not promote giving, one
may wonder why the dictators in the no-information treatments failed to
take advantage of that context. Perhaps a part of the answer is that the
Chinese educational system actively promotes self-sacrifice in ways that have
no equivalence in Norway. One example is “Learn From Lei Feng Day,” held
every March 5th in memory of the late communist soldier Lei Feng. On
this day, pupils, students, and the general public are encouraged to follow
Lei Feng’s example by doing good deeds without seeking recognition. One
consequence of the moral training may be that anonymous giving is seen as
more virtuous and therefore is more potent at generating self-respect. The
training could also play a part in promoting the egalitarian principle that
traditionally is well grounded in the communist ideology. This may explain
why the level of sharing to uninformed peer receivers was higher at Antai




This paper reports results from a modified dictator game in which Chinese
business students face different receivers under different circumstances. Re-
ceivers are either poor or one of the dictators’ peers. The receivers will or will
not be informed about why they receive their money. After the allocation
decision is made, an information option is revealed which allows the dictator
to decide whether or not the receiver will be informed about the origin of the
transfer.
The main motivation for this study was to investigate whether extrinsic
social motivation exerts an influence on allocation decisions in the collectivis-
tic society of China in a way that is similar to the individualistic society of
Norway. The results suggest that this is not the case. While receiver aware-
ness has been found to generate higher levels of sharing in Norway (Cappelen
et al., 2012), the average offers made by the Chinese sample did not depend
on the receivers’ information.
The primary concerns for the dictators in the Chinese sample appear
to have been fairness and need considerations.19 The dictators shared a
relatively large share (20.1%) of their endowment with their uninformed peer
receivers, and about three times more when the receivers were uninformed
and needy. While there is some evidence in the data to support the signaling
theory proposed by Andreoni and Bernheim (2009), this effect does not apply
consistently throughout the experiment.
Even though the receivers’ information did not affect the dictators’ aver-
age generosity level, the level of generosity clearly affected the information
sent to the receivers. The dictators who chose to withhold the information
gave significantly less than those who chose to inform their counterpart.
19Note that some of the fairness considerations differed from those that traditionally
have been studied in economics. For example, some participants reported that destiny
had formed a relationship between them and the receiver, and that this was their reason
for giving.
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In general, this study illustrates the need for more research on the role
that second order beliefs (the dictator’s beliefs about the receiver’s beliefs
about the dictator) play in allocation decisions. In particular, more informa-
tion is needed about why second-order beliefs some times do not translate
into actions.
The different ways in which Chinese and Norwegian students responded
to receiver awareness show how fairness norms that are relied upon in one
culture can be much less influential in another culture. This serves as a
reminder that intercultural engagements are not straight forward, and should
encourage social scientists to explore the cultural scope of their findings.
96
Bibliography
Alesina, Alberto and George-Marios Angeletos (2005). “Fairness and redis-
tribution,” American Economic Review, 95(4): 960–980.
Andreoni, James (1990). “Impure altruism and donations to public goods: A
theory of warm-glow giving,” Economic Journal, 100(401): 464–477.
Andreoni, James (1995). “Warm-glow versus cold-prickle: The effects of posi-
tive and negative framing on cooperation in experiments,” Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics, 110(1): 1–21.
Andreoni, James and B. Douglas Bernheim (2009). “Social image and the
50-50 norm: A theoretical and experimental analysis of audience effects,”
Econometrica, 77(5): 1607–1636.
Arkes, Hal R., Cynthia A. Joyner, Mark V. Pezzo, Jane Gradwohl Nash,
Karen Siegel-Jacobs, and Eric Stone (1994). “The psychology of windfall
gains,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 59(3):
331–347.
Babcock, Linda, George Loewenstein, Samuel Issacharoff, and Colin Camerer
(1995). “Biased judgement of fairness in bargaining,” American Economic
Review, 85(5): 1337– 1343.
Bardsley, Nicholas (2008). “Dictator game giving: altruism or artefact?”
Experimental Economics, 11(2): 122–133.
Bateman, Ian, Daniel Kahneman, Alistar Monro, Chris Starmer, and Robert
Sugden (2005). “Testing competing models of loss aversion: an adversarial
collaboration,” Journal of Public Economics, 89(8): 1561–1580.
97
Battigalli, Pierpaolo and Martin Dufwenberg (2007). “Guilt in games,”
American Economic Review, 97(2): 170–176.
Benabou, Roland and Jean Tirole (2003). “Intrinsic and extrinsic motiva-
tion,” Review of Economic Studies, 70(1): 489–520.
Benz, Matthias and Stephan Meier (2008). “Do people behave in experiments
as in the field? Evidence from donations,” Experimental Economics, 11(3):
268–281.
Berg, Joyce, John Dickhaut, and Kevin McCabe (1995). “Trust, reciprocity,
and social history,” Games and Economic Behavior, 10(1): 122–142.
Berge, Lars Ivar Oppedal, Kjetil Bjorvatn, and Bertil Tungodden (2012).
“Human and financial capital for microenterprise development: Experi-
mental evidence from Tanzania,” mimeo, Norwegian School of Economics.
Bernoulli, Daniel (1954). “Exposition of a new theory on the measurement
of risk,” Econometrica, 22(1): 23–36.
Birkeland, Sigbjørn, Alexander W. Cappelen, Erik Ø. Sørensen, and Bertil
Tungodden (2011). “Immoral criminals? An experimental study of social
preferences among prisoners.” Discussion paper 15/2011, Department of
Economics, NHH Norwegian School of Economics.
Blount, Sally (1995). “When social outcomes aren’t fair: The effect of causal
attributions on preferences,” Organizational Behavior and Human Deci-
sion Processes, 63(2): 131–144.
Bolton, Gary E. and Axel Ockenfels (2000). “ERC: A theory of equity, reci-
procity, and competition,” American Economic Review, 90(1): 166–193.
Brekke, Kjell Arne, Snorre Kverndokk, and Karine Nyborg (2003). “An eco-
nomic model of moral motivation,” Journal of Public Economics, 87(9-10):
1967–1983.
Broberg, Thomas, Tore Ellingsen, and Magnus Johannesson (2007). “Is gen-
erosity involuntary?” Economics Letters, 94(1): 32–37.
98
Bruyn, Arnaud De and Gary E. Bolton (2008). “Estimating the influence of
fairness on bargaining behavior,” Management Science, 54(10): 1774–1791.
Buchan, Nancy, Rachel Croson, Eric Johnson, and George Wu (2005). “Gain
and loss ultimatums,” in John Morgan (ed.), “Experimental and Be-
havioral Economics,” volume 13 of Advances in Applied Microeconomics,
Greenwich, CT: Elsevier Science - JAI Press, pp. 1–23.
Camerer, Colin F. (2000). “Prospect theory in the wild: Evidence from the
field,” in Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (eds.), “Choices,Values and
Frames,” chapter 5, New York: Russell Sage, pp. 148–161.
Camerer, Colin F. (2003). Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic
Interaction, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Camerer, Colin F. and Ernst Fehr (2003). “Measuring social norms and pref-
erences using experimental games: A guide for social scientists,” Institute
for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zürich, Working paper
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Share given in dictator game
Note: The histograms illustrate the distributions of shares offered in the initial allocation
decision. The top row presents the results from China, while the bottom row presents the
results from Norway. The acronyms refer to the receivers in the different treatments as
follows: U-P = uninformed peer; I-P = informed peer; U-N = uninformed needy; I-N =
informed needy.
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Table 3.1: Experimental treatments
Information?
Receiver no NAntai NNHH yes NAntai NNHH
Peer student U-P 35 35 I-P 35 36
Needy person U-N 33 30 I-N 32 32
Note: The four treatments vary according to the receivers’ kind and whether or
not the receivers will be informed about the experiment. The treatment names are
acronyms describing the receivers as follows: U-P = uninformed peer; I-P = informed
peer; U-N = uninformed needy; I-N = informed needy. The number of observations at
each business school is reported to the right of the treatment names.
Table 3.2: Participant demographics
Antai NHH
Age 19.2 21.7
Study year 1.6 2.7
Female 59.3% 33.1%
N 135 133
Note: This table contains participants’ average age, average years of study and
proportion of female participants as reported by the participants in post-experiment
questionnaires. N denotes the total number of participants in each experiment. The NHH
numbers only include participants in the treatments that were also used at Antai.
Table 3.3: Average initial offers
Antai NHH
Information? Information?
Receiver no yes no yes
Peer Student 0.201 0.235 0.116 0.114
(0.036) (0.035) (0.037) (0.034)
Needy Person 0.610 0.576 0.433 0.602
(0.060) (0.052) (0.076) (0.065)
Note: Mean shares offered in the initial allocation decision. Standard errors in
parentheses. Information indicates whether the receiver was to be informed or not about
the details of the experiment. Receiver indicates the kind of recipient that was to receive
the transfer. Antai and NHH indicate Chinese and Norwegian dictators, respectively.
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Table 3.4: The role of fairness
Information?
no yes
diff pMW pT diff pMW pT
Peer student vs -0.409 0.000 0.000 -0.341 0.000 0.000
needy person (Antai)
Peer student vs -0.318 0.000 0.000 -0.488 0.000 0.000
needy person (NHH)
Note: P -values for Mann-Whitney test and one-sided t-test (unequal variances)
testing differences in mean share offered in the initial allocation decision between recipient
groups. The results from China and Norway are presented in the top and bottom rows
respectively. Negative differences indicate that the needy receivers were offered more on
average than the peer group.
Table 3.5: The role of information
Needy receiver?
no yes
diff pMW pT diff pMW pT
Informed vs 0.034 0.510 0.251 -0.034 0.628 0.333
uninformed (Antai)
Informed vs -0.002 0.879 0.486 0.168 0.104 0.049
uninformed (NHH)
Note: P -values for Mann-Whitney test and one-sided t-test (unequal variances)
testing differences in mean share offered in the initial allocation decision between recipient
groups. The results from China and Norway are presented in the top and bottom rows
respectively. Negative differences indicate that the uninformed receivers were offered
more on average than the informed receivers.
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Table 3.6: Shares of participants switching letters
Information choice
Antai NHH





Note: Shares of participants choosing to remove or add information in the cover
letter. The treatment acronyms refer to the receivers’ initial status as follows: U-P =
uninformed peer; I-P = informed peer; U-N = uninformed needy; I-N = informed needy.
Antai and NHH indicate Chinese and Norwegian dictators, respectively.
Table 3.7: Revisions to the allocation decisions
Information choice
Antai NHH
Recipient Remove Add Remove Add
Peer Student -0.013 -0.020 -0.003 0.007
(0.008) (0.015) (0.003) (0.028)
Needy Person -0.029 -0.056 -0.038 0.009
(0.021) (0.035) (0.038) (0.009)
Note: Mean changes in shares offered by dictators who switched their letter. Standard
errors in parentheses. Antai and NHH indicate Chinese and Norwegian dictators,
respectively.
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Table 3.8: Who change their letter?
Offered share
Antai NHH
Treatment No change Remove Add No change Remove Add
U-P 0.103 0.275*** 0.088 0.157
(0.028) (0.053) (0.049) (0.056)
I-P 0.333 0.069*** 0.174 0.047**
(0.041) (0.025) (0.058) (0.024)
U-N 0.500 0.676* 0.347 0.582*
(0.102) (0.073) (0.089) (0.130)
I-N 0.700 0.385*** 0.684 0.481*
(0.060) (0.066) (0.074) (0.115)
Note: Mean shares offered in the initial allocation decision, organized according to
the dictators’ information decisions. Antai and NHH indicate Chinese and Norwegian
dictators, respectively. The treatment acronyms refer to the receivers’ initial type as
follows: U-P = uninformed peer; I-P = informed peer; U-N = uninformed needy; I-N =
informed needy. ***,** and * indicate differences from the relevant“no change” group at




The following is an English translation of the Mandarin instructions that
were used:
INTRODUCTION
Welcome to our experiment. I am X, and will be responsible for today’s
experiment. The results of this experiment will be used as data for economic
research. Please complete the experiment according to the rules. Don’t com-
municate with each other during the experiment. If you have any questions
during the experiment, please raise your hand, our staff will come up to you
to answer your question. Please don’t use any programs that are irrelevant
to this experiment. Please switch off your mobile phone. If you violate the
rules, you will have to leave the lab. Please keep quiet during the waiting
time in the experiment and do not disturb others.
To keep the experiment anonymous, you will not be asked about your
identity and name. In addition, neither our staff, other participants nor any
other persons can discover the decisions you make in the experiment.
When the experiment finishes, there will be a code for picking up your
payments on the screen. Please write down this code on the payment form
on the desk. When you leave the lab, please hand the payment form to
our staff. You will then obtain a corresponding envelope with your payment
inside. The assistant that prepared the envelope will already have left the
lab, so no one will know how much you finally get.
The experiment consists of two parts. I will now explain to you how to
take part in the first part.
PART 1
In the first part, that is the labor part, you need to achieve a task within
15 min. In the task, you need to find the right number in a big form that
contains different numbers. When you find one number, you will get one
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point. If you make a mistake, you will lose one point. You can always skip
the current form and continue with the next one. You need to find 70 correct
numbers within the provided time. During the process, your current points
and remaining time will appear on the screen.
If you finish the task before the provided time, there will be related in-
formation on the screen. Please remain quiet and wait for the second part.
Do you have any questions? If yes, please raise your hand. Our staff will
come up to you to clarify. . . Everyone understands. There will soon be new
content on the screen. The experiment begins immediately.
Note: Instructions in both the first and second part of the experiment
were then presented on screen.
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3.6.2 Selected illustrations
Figure 3.3 shows a screenshot of the task that the dictators faced in the
production phase.
Figure 3.3: Production task
Translation:
Production phase
For every correctly chosen number, you earn 1 point; for every incorrectly
chosen number, you loose one point.
When you have received a total of 70 points, the production task will be
completed.
You can click on the “Submit” button below the table at any time. This
will generate a new table.
In the table below, find and select the number 864.
Remaining time:
You have earned 2 points, out of 70 points.
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Figure 3.4: Letter to the informed peer receivers
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Figure 3.5: Letter to the uninformed peer receivers
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Figure 3.6: Letter to the informed needy receivers
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Figure 3.7: Letter to the uninformed needy receivers
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Translations of letters:
Letter to the informed peer receivers
Dear classmate,
Shanghai Jiao Tong University Antai College of Economics and Manage-
ment recently held an economic experiment. As a counterpart in the experi-
ment, you receive x Yuan. You were randomly selected from the students at
Antai College of Economics and Management.
In the experiment, the participant (who is also a student at Antai College
of Economics and Management) earned 40 Yuan by achieving a task. At
the same time, he (or she) was informed that a randomly selected student
from the Antai College of Economics and Management (you) would be his
counterpart and that he would decide the amount given to the counterpart.
Before he made this decision, he already read a copy of this letter.
He decided to give you x Yuan. The money is in this envelope. If there is
no money in the envelope, it means that the participant didn’t give you any
money.
If you have any questions about our experiment, please send an e-mail to
bardu@hotmail.com to contact our staff.
Have a nice day!
Letter to the uninformed peer receivers
Dear classmate,
Shanghai Jiao Tong University Antai College of Economics and Manage-
ment recently held an economic experiment. As a counterpart in the experi-
ment, you receive x Yuan. You were randomly selected from the students at
Antai College of Economics and Management.
If you have any questions about our experiment, please send an e-mail to
bardu@hotmail.com to contact our staff.
Have a nice day!
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Letter to the informed needy receivers
Dear classmate,
Shanghai Jiao Tong University Antai College of Economics and Man-
agement recently held an economic experiment. As a counterpart in the
experiment, you receive x Yuan. You were randomly selected from a name
list provided by the Shanghai Jiao Tong University Siyuan Commonweal
Organization.
In the experiment, the participant (who is a student at Antai College of
Economics and Management) earned 40 Yuan by achieving a task. At the
same time, he (or she) was informed that a randomly selected pupil in Yigang
Middle School (you) would be his counterpart and that he would decide the
amount given to the counterpart. Before he made this decision, he already
read a copy of this letter.
He decided to give you x Yuan. The money is in this envelope. If there is
no money in the envelope, it means that the participant didn’t give you any
money.
If you have any questions about our experiment, please contact the teacher
from Siyuan Commonweal Organization or send an e-mail to bardu@hotmail.com
to contact our staff.
Have a nice day!
Letter to the uninformed needy receivers
Dear classmate,
Shanghai Jiao Tong University Antai College of Economics and Man-
agement recently held an economic experiment. As a counterpart in the
experiment, you receive x Yuan. You were randomly selected from a name
list provided by the Shanghai Jiao Tong University Siyuan Commonweal
Organization.
If you have any questions about our experiment, please contact the teacher
from Siyuan Commonweal Organization or send an e-mail to bardu@hotmail.com
to contact our staff.
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Abstract: This paper investigates whether individuals are loss averse
with respect to their status quo wealth level in sharing situations. In a real
effort dictator game, dictators are asked to share their earnings either before
or after earning them. The instructions also variably emphasize the amount
that the dictator will give or receive at the end of the experiment. This
study finds that whether the money is already earned or not has no statisti-
cally significant effects on the average sharing behavior, regardless of which
instructions are used. The results indicate that dictator game participants
are not loss averse with respect to their status quo wealth level.
4.1 Introduction
Studies of choice behavior have shown that people often behave as if losses
affect utility considerably more than gains do (Camerer, 2000). This phe-
nomenon is known as loss aversion. Behavior consistent with loss aversion
has been observed in both field settings and controlled experiments, and the
concept explains regularities that appear as anomalies when analyzed with
standard expected utility theories. Some examples are preference reversals
when lotteries are framed as losses instead of gains (Tversky and Kahneman,
1981) and discrepancies between the willingness-to-pay and the willingness-
to-accept for simple goods (Horowitz and McConnell, 2002).
Another well-documented behavioral trait is people’s willingness to pay
for fair outcomes (Konow, 2000; Cappelen et al., 2007). Fairness motives
are often studied with dictator games, where interaction is anonymous and
players singlehandedly decide the allocation of an asset between themselves
and a counterpart (Forsythe et al., 1994). Average offers in dictator games
typically range between 25 to 40% of the available endowment, with a large
share of participants giving away 50% (Camerer, 2003; Engel, 2011). Vari-
ations in offer distributions between dictator game treatments indicate that
people’s generosity varies according to context.
Given that the willingness to share with others depends on the context,
and that loss aversion plays a role in many other settings, it seems natural to
ask whether loss aversion is also a concern in sharing decisions. In lay-man
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terms, do people perceive it more costly to give away money that they have
in their hand (a loss) than to commit to give from future earnings (a reduced
gain)? The answer to this question may, for instance, have important impli-
cations for the optimal design of tax policies. Under the Norwegian tax code,
the estimated income tax for wage earners is deducted before the earnings are
received. On the other hand, self-employed individuals are required to pay
their estimated income tax from their own bank account in four installments
over the year. The difference in the timing of the tax payments suggests that
wage earners see their taxes as reductions of gains, while the self-employed
perceive their taxes as losses. This would mean that the per krone cost of
paying income tax is experienced more intensely by self-employed individuals
than by wage earners.
This paper presents results from a real effort dictator game where the
participants decide how much to share either before or after they earn their
money. If the participants are loss averse with respect to what they have
earned, then earning the money should affect the way potential offers are
evaluated by the two groups. Before the earning task, an offer constitutes a
reduction of a gain, while after the earning task the same offer constitutes
a loss. Loss averse participants are expected to be more willing to share in
the Before treatment compared to the After treatment. The difference in
willingness to share should be evident in both average offers and the fraction
of participants choosing to share.
In order to evaluate the robustness of any influences from decision timing,
two different formulations are used when the participants are asked to share.
In each timing treatment, about half of the participants are asked to state
the amount they wish to give away, while the second half are asked to state
the amount they wish to receive themselves.
The results indicate that the dictators are not loss averse with respect
to their status quo wealth level. The average offers were not statistically
significantly different before and after the endowment was earned. The dif-
ference in timing also did not generate statistically significant differences in
the shares of participants willing to offer positive amounts. The main results
were the same regardless of whether the give or the receive formulation was
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used to present the sharing decision.
Previous findings in experimental economics show that male and female
participants may respond differently to contextual changes (Croson and Gneezy,
2009; Eckel and Grossman, 2008). This also appears to be the case in the
current experiment. The female participants shared less after earning their
money when the give formulation was used. This result could, in isolation,
be seen as evidence of loss aversion. But, when the receive formulation was
used, the offers from the female participants increased after the earning task.
In contrast, the male participants do not appear to be affected by the timing
of the decision at all.
Loss aversion theory offers no explanation for why the timing effect de-
pends on context and gender in the way that is observed here. I therefore
conclude that the changes in offers by the female participants are due to con-
textual influences other than loss aversion. If we assume that the results can
be extrapolated to other sharing situations, this experiment shows that pol-
icy makers do not have to be concerned with loss aversion related to people’s
status quo wealth.
The next section relates this paper to the existing literature. The experi-
mental design is described in detail in Section 4.3, and the results are covered
in Section 4.4. Section 4.5 draws some conclusions.
4.2 Related literature
Loss aversion is perhaps best known to economists as a central concept of
the prospect theory developed by Kahneman and Tversky (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991, 1992).2 Prospect theory as-
sumes that people simplify decisions by evaluating outcomes in terms of the
implied changes in wealth, rather than the resulting wealth levels. Sugden
(2003) argues that an adequate theory of choice behavior should incorpo-
rate concerns for wealth levels as well as changes, and develops an axiomatic
version of expected utility theory that incorporates loss aversion.
2See also Tversky and Kahneman (1981, 1986); Novemsky and Kahneman (2005).
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The classifying of outcomes as gains or losses relies on a reference point.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) write that “the reference point usually corre-
sponds to the current asset position, in which case gains and losses coincide
with the actual amounts that are received or paid.” Similarly, Sugden (2003)
opts to “interpret an agent’s reference point as her current endowments.” The
assumption that the current endowment is an important reference point has
experimental support in Bateman, Kahneman, Monro, Starmer, and Sugden
(2005) and forms the basis for the experiment in this paper.3
The implications of loss aversion for pro-social behavior has received little
attention from researchers. A notable exception is Buchan, Croson, Johnson,
and Wu (2005) who study the distributions of positive and negative outcomes
in ultimatum games.4 In their experiments, losses are either hypothetical or
deducted from a 10 USD show-up fee. The authors find that both offers
and demands are higher when bargains are over losses (proposers are more
generous and receivers more demanding). The pattern is the same in four
experiments from three different countries, suggesting that their results are
relatively robust.
Small (2010) conducts a dictator game treatment where all participants
start out with equal endowments. Once the roles are randomly assigned,
the researchers remove the receivers’ endowments. This loss of endowment
generates higher levels of sympathy, as well as higher offers, from the dicta-
tors, compared to a treatment where the receivers never had any endowment
to begin with.This experiment suggests that dictators are sensitive to other
people’s losses, but it does not establish whether dictators are loss averse
with respect to their own endowment.
Other researchers have studied the effect of framing the dictator’s choice
as a taking option, rather than a giving option (Swope, Cadigan, Schmitt, and
Shupp, 2008; Visser and Roelofs, 2011; Dreber, Ellingsen, Johannesson, and
Rand, 2011).5 In taking situations, all or half of the endowment is initially
3This paper will variably refer to “current endowments” as “status quo wealth.”
4Ultimatum games are similar to dictator games, except that the receiver may de-
cline the offer. If an offer is declined, then the dictator’s endowment is returned to the
experimenter.
5Experiments conducted by List (2007); Bardsley (2008); Cappelen, Nielsen, Sørensen,
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allocated with the receiver, but the dictator still decides how the combined
endowment is to be split. Any amount taken from the receiver could be seen
as a gain for the dictator, and the shares left with the receiver could be seen
as a reduction of the dictator’s gain. This suggests that offers will be higher
with a take frame, than with a give frame, if the dictators are loss averse.
The results of these experiments are mixed, and inferences are hindered by
an important confounding effect: The initial allocation of the endowment
is intended to influence the perceived property rights. Dictators in taking
treatments could be allocating more money to the receiver because they are
loss averse, but also because “taking” is seen as less socially acceptable than
“not giving” (Krupka and Weber, 2012).
In the give/take dictator games, entitlements to the experimental endow-
ment are indicated with either language frames or by placing the endowment
in labeled envelopes. Konow (2000); Cappelen et al. (2010) show that an
alternative, and possibly more salient, method for establishing entitlements
is to ask the participants to generate their endowment by taking part in
an earning task. The authors’ results suggest that, under ceteris paribus
conditions, the principle of equal pay for equal work has broad support.
It appears that no previous dictator games contain treatments where the
participants must earn their endowment after deciding on the allocation.
Two related papers, namely Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat, and Smith (1994);
Cherry et al. (2002), compare dictator game treatments with and without
effort. In Hoffman et al. (1994) the role as dictator is assigned to the best
performing participants, while in Cherry et al. (2002) the dictators are paid
according to their performance in a quiz. In both cases, the average offers are
statistically significantly lower when the participants have to exercise effort,
compared to when roles and endowments are distributed randomly. But, as
with the give/take experiments, there are (at least) two theories that can
explain the result. On the one hand, the effort may have legitimized small
offers by making the dictators more deserving. On the other hand, the effort
Tungodden, and Tyran (2013) represent a different class of experiments where a taking
option is added to the dictator’s strategy set. They find that this way of expanding the
strategy-set lowers average offers. There are also several papers investigating the effects
of give/take frames in public good games, starting with Andreoni (1995).
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may have increased the sensation of having earned the endowment, making
offers more likely to be coded as losses instead of reductions of gains. Both
theories predict the observed reductions in average offers.
The current paper contributes to the literature by showing how one may
test for loss aversion without the confounding influences of varying enti-
tlements or deserts. In the experiment, all participants perform the same
earning task in all treatments. This means that there is no difference in
entitlements or deserts that can explain potential differences in sharing be-
havior. On the other hand, if there is no difference in sharing behavior, then
the experiment strengthens the suggested interpretations of the experiments
referred to above.
The paper also presents a novel mechanism for untangling a confounding
issue regarding the reference point. It may be that the status quo only
functions as a reference point to the extent that it corresponds with the
agent’s expectations about the future. The question of whether “present
wealth” or “customary wealth” best captures the concept of a reference point
was already raised by Markowitz (1952), but it has gained recent attention
with the contributions of Köszegi and Rabin (2007); Gill and Prowse (2012).
The current experiment distinguishes expectations from the status quo by
announcing the expected outcome to the participants at the beginning of
the experiment. This way, the status quo wealth can be changed without
affecting the participants’ expectations. The mechanism thus enables the
current experiment to establish whether the status quo wealth serves as an
important reference point in its own right.
4.3 Experimental design
This paper assumes that people are loss averse with respect to their current
endowment when they consider sharing their money with others. By defini-
tion, an individual’s current endowment is equal to the individual’s status quo
wealth, i.e., the current endowment does not include expected income.6 The
6Given this definition, an individual’s status quo wealth is likely to be a closer match
with his most recently filed tax report than with his expected lifetime earnings.
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experiment chosen to test the assumption is a modified version of the dicta-
tor game. Dictator games are well suited for studying preferences in sharing
situations because strategic motives do not play a role in these games. The
current version consists of an earning phase, a distribution phase, a post-
experiment questionnaire, and anonymous payment procedures. The main
treatment is a modification of the timing of the earning phase, relative to the
distribution phase. Participants assigned to the Before treatments enter the
distribution phase immediately before the earning phase, and vice versa for
participants in the After treatments. The chronological order of the phases
is shown in table 4.1.
[Table 4.1 about here.]
In the earning phase, the participants are asked to perform two nearly
identical tasks on a computer. Both tasks involve identifying a specified
three digit number 120 times in tables with several other numbers.7 The
only difference between the tasks is the number to be identified.8 The time
allotted for completing each task is 15 minutes. The participants are informed
from the start that one of the earning tasks will yield a high amount, 175
NOK (≈ 28 USD), and that the other will yield a low amount, 25 NOK (≈ 4
USD). They are also told that a random draw will pick one of the two tasks
to count toward the payment from the experiment.
The earning phase plays two roles. First, it defines the dictator’s en-
dowment as either expected income or status quo wealth. This distinction
is crucial since expected income represents a gain, while status quo wealth
is included in the reference point. Figure 4.1 illustrates how, for loss averse
individuals, the utility impact associated with a reduction of a gain is smaller
than the utility impact associated with an equally sized loss. The difference
is due to the utility function being considerably steeper in the loss domain
than in the gain domain. As a consequence, the cost of sharing with others is
7A screen shot of the earning phase is included in the appendix.
8The numbers 547 and 492 were used after pretests indicated that those numbers were
equally hard to locate.
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experienced more intensely if the offer comes from status quo wealth rather
than expected income. If the dictators are loss averse, then they should be
less willing to share after the earning phase.
[Figure 4.1 about here.]
The second role of the earning phase is to provide a reason for sharing.
The production tasks are deliberately designed so that ability should be an
irrelevant factor for the success rate. This feature limits the participants’
opportunity to favor their own effort based on merit.9 It is also intentional
that the tasks should be perceived as boring, so that the monetary earnings
will be the sole rewards. Results from previous experiments suggest that
since all participants are required to perform the same tasks, most of the
participants will think that the fairest distribution of the earnings will be for
everyone to receive the same amount (Konow, 2000; Cappelen et al., 2010).
It is therefore likely that the earning phase establishes a sense among the
participants that the initial distribution of earnings is unfair. The sense of
unfairness is expected to be independent of the experimental treatments,
meaning that the benefit of sharing is the same in all the treatments.
In the distribution phase, the participants are matched so that one in each
pair will receive a high payment and the other will receive a low payment.
Before the outcome of the earning phase is revealed, every participant is
asked to state how much he (or she) will be willing to share if he ends up
as the high earner in his pair.10 The participants are only given authority
over their own earnings, meaning that every participant will be rewarded
at least 25 NOK for passing the tasks. While this constrains the set of
possible allocations of the total earnings, it ensures that the participants
have a pecuniary incentive to work on the tasks. Both the earning and the
distribution phases are explained to the participants at the beginning of the
9See Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff, and Camerer (1995) and Dana et al. (2007)
for discussions about self-serving bias in fairness considerations.
10Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2011) found that role uncertainty encourages altruistic behavior
in dictator games. However, there is little reason to think that role uncertainty has any
impact on the effects of loss aversion.
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session, and the participants are encouraged to direct any questions that they
might have to the assistants.
At the end of each session, a computer calculates payments for each par-
ticipant based on the randomly chosen high earners’ allocation decisions.
The participants are then informed about their role and about their mone-
tary outcome. Cash payments are prepared in envelopes by a research as-
sistant outside the lab and handed out without this person being present.
Computer-generated payment codes provide the link between the envelopes
and the participants. The payment procedure makes sure that neither the
experimenters nor other participants can observe the payments to any partic-
ular participant. Before the experiment begins, the participants are informed
about the payment procedure, and that complete anonymity will be facili-
tated in the experiment.
Several researchers have commented on the sensitivity of dictator behav-
ior with respect to context (Camerer and Fehr, 2003; Cox, Gotimer, Roy,
Castellanos, Milham, and Kelly, 2010; Smith, 2010). Because dictator game
behavior in general, and the influence of loss aversion on offers in particular,
might depend on the way a sharing option is presented, two sets of instruc-
tions are used. Half of the participants in each timing treatment are given
instructions which state that the high earner can increase the amount that
the counterpart receives by choosing to give away some of his earnings. These
participants are then asked to record the amount that they would like to give
away, provided that they end up as high earners. In the instructions to the
remaining participants, it is stated that the counterpart’s payment can be
increased if the high earner chooses to reduce the amount that he receives
himself. In this version, the participants are asked to record the amount that
they would like to receive from their own earnings. These control treatments
will be referred to as Give and Receive treatments, corresponding to whether
the dictator states the amount to be given or received. In total, the experi-
ment has four different treatments, organized in a 2× 2 design: Before-Give,
After-Give, Before-Receive, and After-Receive.11
The experiment was conducted at the Norwegian School of Economics
11The participants are not informed about the treatment variations.
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(NHH) in March 2010 with students from the NHH bachelor’s and master’s
programs in economics and business administration. Participants were re-
cruited via e-mail and signed up online in one of the available sessions. A
compensation of 100 NOK (≈ 16 USD) to cover the opportunity cost of par-
ticipating was announced in the invitation, as well as the opportunity to earn
an unspecified amount of money in the experiment.
Eight sessions were conducted in a single day, and each session lasted
about 50 minutes, including registration and payment. The lab was set up
in a classroom large enough to accommodate at least one free seat between
each participant, and dividers were used to limit the participants’ ability to
observe each other’s actions.12 Treatments were randomly assigned to an
equal number of participants within each session. Instructions and interac-




Table 4.2 shows the demographic profile of the participants in each of the
four treatments. In total, 197 students showed up for the experiment, of
which 177 passed the requirements for being included in the analysis.14 The
average age of the participants was 22.9 years, and 40% were female. The
participants were, on average, in their third year at NHH.
[Table 4.2 about here.]
12Keeping dictators and receivers in the same room has been found to increase the
credibility of the experiment (Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Moore, 2001).
13Screen shots of the production task and the allocation choice are included in the
appendix.
14The computer program skipped the post-experiment questionnaire for the 16 partic-
ipants in the first session due to empty workstations being logged on to the experiment.
In addition, four participants were excluded because they did not pass the earning phase
of the experiment. Excluding these 20 participants has no qualitative implications for the
result of the analysis.
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If the participants were loss averse, and the earning task shifted their
reference point, then one would expect the average offers to be higher in the
Before treatments than in the After treatments. One would also expect that
a higher percentage of the participants would be willing to share some of
their endowment in the Before treatments.
As reported in table 4.3, the participants in the Before treatments offered
to share 10.9% of their endowment on average, while participants in the
After treatments offered to share 9.6% on average. The difference is not
statistically significant (Mann-Whitney p-value = 0.93). When the sharing
decision came before the earning task, 56.7% chose not to offer anything.
Contrary to what loss aversion would imply, this share decreased in the After
treatments to 50.6%. The difference in shares of non-sharing participants is
also not statistically significant (Pearson’s χ21 p-value = 0.42).
The aggregated results are robust with respect to both versions of the
instructions. The difference in average offers is somewhat larger in the treat-
ments where the Give formulation was used to present the sharing option,
but it is still not statistically significant (Mann-Whitney p-value = 0.49).
Where the Receive formulation was used, the difference is smaller, has the
opposite sign, and remains statistically insignificant (Mann-Whitney p-value
= 0.45). The fractions of non-sharing participants are lower after the earning
task, regardless of which instructions were used. The largest difference oc-
curred with the Receive formulation, with 64.4% keeping everything before
the earning task, and 54.6% keeping all they had earned after the earning
task. This difference is also statistically insignificant (Pearson’s χ21 p-value
= 0.34). These results suggest that earning the money did not affect the
participants’ sharing behavior.
In all treatments, the maximum offers were 42.9% (75 NOK) of the dicta-
tor’s endowment. An offer of 42.9% meant that the payments to the dictator
and the receiver would be equal, since the receiver was sure to receive NOK
25 from his own earning task. This sure payment helps to explain why the
average offers were somewhat lower than what is commonly observed in dic-
tator games (Camerer, 2003). The average offer across all treatments was
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10.2% of the dictator’s endowment, meaning that the average receiver was
paid 21.5% of the total earnings of his pair.
[Table 4.3 about here.]
Although the participants were allowed to offer any integer amount up
to the full endowment of 175 NOK, figure 4.2 shows that the participants
generally preferred to make offers that were a multiple of 25 NOK. In all,
89.3% of the offers were either zero, 25 NOK, 50 NOK, or 75 NOK. This
behavior may be linked to the initial distribution of the earned endowments
(175 NOK to the high earners and 25 NOK to the low earners). If the par-
ticipants were rounding off their preferred offers, this may have affected the
average levels of sharing, as well as the variances of the offer distributions.
Even so, one should still expect to see less sharing in the After treatments,
relative to the Before treatments, if the participants were loss averse in the
sense that is assumed here.
[Figure 4.2 about here.]
4.4.2 Gender differences
Croson and Gneezy (2009); Eckel and Grossman (2008) have remarked that
female dictator game participants generally appear to be more sensitive to
contextual cues than are male participants. This is also evident in the current
experiment, as there are distinct differences in the way that the male and
the female participants responded to the timing treatment.15 While the male
participants did not respond to the timing of the decision in a statistically
significant way, the female participants did.
With the Give formulation, the female participants reduced their offers
from an average of 23.2% before earning their money, to 12.2% on average
15The timing effect is statistically significantly stronger for the females than for the
males in both the Give and the Receive treatments (t-test p-values < 0.001).
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after the earning phase (Mann-Whitney p-value = 0.03). By itself, this result
is consistent with loss aversion theory. However, the timing effect was in the
opposite direction when the Receive formulation was used. When the female
participants were asked to state how much they would like to receive of their
own money, the average offer increased from 5.7% in the Before treatment,
to 11.3% in the After treatment (Mann-Whitney p-value = 0.04).
The average offers from the male participants were 7.6% and 7.1% with
the Give formulation, and 10.6% and 8.9% with the Receive formulation,
before and after the earning phase, respectively. The differences are in the
direction suggested by loss aversion theory, but neither of them are econom-
ically or statistically significant (Mann-Whitney p-values = 0.55 and 0.51,
respectively).
As shown in table 4.4, the percentage of male participants who chose
not to share was relatively stable across the treatments. The percentages
ranged from 54.2% in the After-Give treatment to 69.0% in the Before-Give
treatment. For the female participants, the choice of whether or not to share
appears to strongly depend on the treatment. In the Before-Give treatment
only 12.5% chose not to share, while in the Before-Receive treatment 77.8%
chose this option.16
[Table 4.4 about here.]
The increase in average offers that occurred when the female participants
in the Receive treatments earned their money goes against the predictions of
loss aversion theory. A potential explanation for this result is that the female
participants responded to experimenter demand effects before earning their
money, but less so after earning it. That is, they may have interpreted
the Receive (Give) formulation as an encouragement from the experimenter
to give less (more) than they otherwise would prefer. This interpretation
also accounts for the reduction in offers after the earning phase in the Give
16The low number of observations suggests that Pearson’s chi-squared test may be un-
reliable in this case. Instead, the difference was tested with a binomial probability test
of whether any of the two proportions of non-givers were equal to 0.46. Both tests were
rejected with p-values <0.01.
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treatments, and why the share of non-giving females varied so much between
the Before treatments.
Rosnow and Rosenthal (1997) point out that experimenter demand effects
tend to be stronger when the experimenter and participant have a different
gender. As all assistants in the experiment were male, this may explain why
there were no equivalent effects on the male subsample. The dampening of
the experimenter demand effect after the earning phase may be due to more
salient entitlements in these treatments.
4.5 Conclusion
The evidence reported in this paper does not support the idea that individ-
uals are loss averse with respect to their status quo wealth level when they
decide how to share their money. Loss aversion theory suggests that individ-
uals experience it as more costly to share money when the offer is perceived
as a loss, rather than a reduced gain. Assuming that the reference point is
the individual’s net current endowment, this paper asks whether real effort
dictator game participants are more willing to share from expected income
than from money they have already earned. The timing of the sharing de-
cision, relative to earning the money, does not affect the sharing decisions
made by male participants. While there is a timing effect on sharing by
the female participants, this effect is not robust with respect to contextual
changes.
The female participants who were asked to report the amount they wished
to “give” shared more if they had not yet earned their money. In contrast, the
average offers increased after the earning task from the female participants
who were asked to report the amount they wished to “receive.” There are no
elements of loss aversion theory that explain why the timing effect depends
on circumstance in the way that is observed here.
A practical implication of the results is that policies directed toward
wealth redistribution do not have to be concerned with loss aversion effects.
This is relevant for both taxation authorities and charity organizations who
could otherwise frame contributions as coming from future income, rather
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than status quo wealth, in order to lessen the perceived costs of giving. At
the same time, the results also illustrate that framing impacts the willing-
ness to share in ways that are still not satisfactorily understood.17 Further
research is required to explain why timing affected the female participants
while the male participants were unaffected.
Two caveats should also be noted. First, when the data is broken down
by both treatment and gender, the number of observations per cell becomes
relatively small. For any treatment, fewer than 20 participants were female.
While the number of observations is large enough to detect statistically sig-
nificant effects, there is also a risk that the small sample is atypical for the
wider population.
Second, it may be the case that most people are loss averse, but that the
reference point formation takes a different form than is assumed here. Köszegi
and Rabin (2007); Gill and Prowse (2012) argue that expected outcomes are
important reference points for individuals. If the expected outcome is the
only reference point, this would mean that when the production task and
payment mechanism were explained in the beginning of the experiment, the
reference point would be set to 100 NOK.18 Any participant who ended up
as a high earner (earning 175 NOK) would therefore have a gain of 75 NOK
to give from before incurring losses. This situation would be the same in all
the treatments.
Reference-dependent preference theories generally suffer from ambiguity
concerning the definition of the reference point. This leaves the theories
incomplete and hinders their applicability. Previous research has studied the
behavioral effects of fixing the participants’ endowments while manipulating
their expectations (Arkes, Joyner, Pezzo, Nash, Siegel-Jacobs, and Stone,
1994). The current paper shows how to take the opposite approach by fixing
the expectations while manipulating the endowments. This procedure adds
a new tool to the toolbox for those interested in identifying the nature of
17The is nothing new about the fact that a small change in the way a sharing option is
presented may have a large impact on the level of sharing. See Engel (2011) for numerous
other examples.
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Güth, Werner and Reinhard Tietz (1990). “Ultimatum bargaining behavior
– A survey and comparison of experimental results,” Journal of Economic
Psychology, 11(3): 417–449.
Hoffman, Elisabeth, Kevin McCabe, Keith Shachat, and Vernon Smith
(1994). “Preferences, property rights and anonymity in bargaining games,”
Games and Economic Behavior, 7(3): 346–380.
Hofstede, Geert, Gert Jan Hofstede, and Michael Minkov (2010). Cultures
and organizations: Software of the mind: Intercultural cooperation and its
importance for survival, McGraw-Hill, 3rd edition.
Hoggatt, Austin C. (1959). “An experimental business game,” Behavioral
Science, 4(3): 192–203.
Horowitz, John K. and Kenneth E. McConnell (2002). “A review of
WTA/WTP studies,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Manage-
ment, 44(3): 426–447.
147
International Comparison Program (2008). “2005 international comparison
program: Tables of final results,” International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development/ The World Bank.
Iriberri, Nagore and Pedroi Rey-Biel (2011). “The role of role uncertainty in
modified dictator games,” Experimental Economics, 14(2): 160–180.
Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard Thaler (1986a). “Fairness
and the assumptions of economics,” Journal of Business, 59(4): 285–300.
Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard Thaler (1986b). “Fairness
as a constraint on profit seeking: Entitlements in the market,” American
Economic Review, 76(4): 728–741.
Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky (1979). “Prospect theory: An analysis
of decision under risk,” Econometrica, 47(2): 263–291.
Karlan, Dean (2005). “Using experimental economics to measure social cap-
ital and predict financial decisions,” American Economic Review, 95(5):
1688–1699.
Karni, Edi and Zvi Safra (2002). “Individual sense of justice: A utility rep-
resentation,” Econometrica, 70(1): 263–284.
Konow, James (1996). “A positive theory of economic fairness,” Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization, 31(1): 13–35.
Konow, James (2000). “Fair shares: Accountability and cognitive dissonance
in allocation decisions,” American Economic Review, 90(4): 1072–1091.
Konow, James (2010). “Mixed feelings: Theories and evidence on giving,”
Journal of Public Economics, 94(3-4): 279–297.
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ingsinstitutet vid Handelshögskolan i Stockholm (EFI).
Stoop, Jan (2012). “From the lab to the field: Envelopes, dictators and
manners,” MPRA working paper No. 37048.
150
Sugden, Robert (2003). “Reference-dependent subjective expected utility,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 111(2): 172–191.
Swope, Kurtis, John Cadigan, Pamela Schmitt, and Robert Shupp (2008).
“Social position and distributive justice: Experimental evidence,” South-
ern Economic Journal, 74(3): 811–818.
Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman (1981). “The framing of decisions and
the psychology of choice,” Science, 211: 453–458.
Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman (1986). “Rational choice and the fram-
ing of decisions,” Journal of Business, 59(4): 251–278.
Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman (1991). “Loss aversion in riskless
choice: A reference-dependent model,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
106(4): 1039–1061.
Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman (1992). “Advances in prospect theory:
Cumulative representation of uncertainty,” Journal of Risk and Uncer-
tainty, 5(5): 297–323.
Visser, Michael S. and Matthew R. Roelofs (2011). “Heterogeneous pref-
erences for altruism: Gender and personality, social status, giving and
taking,” Experimental Economics, 14(4): 490–506.
Yutang, Lin (1935). My Country and My People, Reynal & Hitchcock.
151
Figure 4.1: Loss aversion may affect sharing decisions
 
U(w-r) 





Note: Loss averse individuals derive utility from the difference between their wealth (w)
and their reference point (r). In the figure, the reference point is located at the origin.
The difference between wealth and the reference point is measured along the abscissa.
The utility function is steeper in the loss domain (w − r < 0) than in the gain domain
(w− r > 0). Assuming that the reference point is the individual’s status quo wealth level,
and that it does not include expected income, parting with an amount (x) will impact
utility less if it is deducted from expected income (a) than if it is coming from the status
quo wealth level (b).
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Offers in amounts of NOK
Note: Dictator offers in NOK. 89.3% of offers are a multiple of 25 NOK .
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Table 4.1: Experimental phases
Treatments Before After
Phases Allocation decision Earning task
Earning task Allocation decision
Questionnaire Questionnaire
Payment Payment
Note: All four treatments consist of the same four phases. The only difference in
ordering is whether the allocation phase occurs before or after the earning task.
Table 4.2: Participant descriptive statistics by treatment
Treatment Female Age Year at NHH N
Before-Give 36% 23.1 2.8 45
After-Give 44% 23.0 2.7 43
Before-Receive 40% 22.6 3.1 45
After-Receive 39% 22.8 3.1 44
Total 40% 22.9 3.0 177
Note: Averages of the participants’ gender, age, and current year of study at
NHH, as reported in the post-experiment questionnaire. Two participants chose not to
report their year at NHH.
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Table 4.3: Aggregate results (%)
Treatment Mean Standard Share not N
offer error offering
Before 10.89 1.58 56.67 90
After 9.56 1.41 50.57 87
Before-Give 13.14 2.28 48.89 45
After-Give 9.31 1.84 46.51 43
Before-Receive 8.63 2.15 64.44 45
After-Receive 9.81 2.14 54.55 44
Note: Mean offers and standard errors reported as percentage of the dictator’s en-
dowment (175 NOK). Share not offering refers to the share of participants who chose
not to offer anything. The first two lines report the pooled results of the respective
sub-treatments. (The total number of observations is 177.)
Table 4.4: Results by gender and treatment (%)
Gender Statistic Before- After- Before- After-
Give Give Receive Receive
Male Mean offer 7.59 7.05 10.58 8.89
(2.37) (1.95) (2.98) (2.84)
Not offering 69.0 54.2 55.6 66.7
N 29 24 27 27
Female Mean offer 23.21 12.18 5.71 11.26
(3.66) (3.31) (2.94) (3.30)
Not offering 12.5 36.8 77.8 35.3
N 16 19 18 17
Note: Mean offers are reported as shares of the dictators’ endowment (175 NOK).
Standard errors in parentheses. Not offering refers to the share of participants who chose




Figure 4.3 shows a screenshot of the task that the participants faced in the
production phase.
Figure 4.3: Production task
Translation:
Production task
You earn one point for each correct mark, and lose one point for each
incorrect mark.
You may produce a new table at any time by pressing the “Submit” button.
You currently have 0 points. To pass the task you need 120 points.




Figure 4.4: Allocation choice in the After-Give treatment




Situation 1 of 2
You have earned 175 NOK from the first task in the production phase.
You are now matched with another participant who has earned 25 NOK from
the same task.
You can increase what the other receives by choosing to give away some of
what you have earned.





Situation 1 of 2
You have earned 175 NOK from the first task in the production phase.
You are now matched with another participant who has earned 25 NOK from
the same task.
You can increase what the other receives by choosing to reduce what you
receive yourself.
Write down how much you wish to receive yourself from the amount you have
earned:
[Submit]
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